BREDA 65 - A COMPARATIVE HISTORY.

Explaining the historical role and mission profile of 'Assalto' aircraft, such as the Ba 65 is not simple. Explaining why the Breda 65 failed to match the requirements of that tightly defined role is also complex. I drafted a fairly short history which more or less achieved that, but it read as though the Ba 65 was the only contemporary design with the relevant flaws, and therefore misrepresented Italian attempts to evolve new combat roles and strategies as especially flawed, when they were in reality innovative and partially successful. I have therefore provided a comparative history which explains the 'assalto' role from a wider international perspective.

Throughout I will explain where Breda 65s were based in real life, what their targets were, and what bases we should use to simulate their real combat and training sorties within FS9. When entering the supplied ATC flight plan codes such as HE0L and HE0J into the FS9 World/Goto menu be careful to note whether the code contains an O (oh!) or a zero (0) or an I or a 1. Only by flying the real sorties, over (or between) the real terrain, in real weather, (without cheating by using electronic navigation aids), can we really understand the historical limitations of the Breda 65.

Many flight simulation enthusiasts have only limited understanding of different combat mission profiles and therefore struggle to plan appropriate 4D flight plan profiles with an appropriate mix of warload and fuel. This history and the other supplied text 'How to survive flying the Ba 65' are intended to address that deficiency. Claims in books and on the internet that the Ba 65 was designed to be 'a jack of all trades' are false. It was to the contrary over optimised for the 'assalto' mission and was either functionally useless when deployed to fly other missions, or disadvantaged.

The aeroplane the Regia Aeronautica procured as its multi role combat aircraft (MRCA) was the very different Caproni Ca 300 which had military designations from Ca 308 to Ca 314 depending on the role for which each military variant was optimised. Different versions of the Caproni MRCA had different names too, but none of them could perform the assalto mission for which the Ba 65 was highly optimised.


THE 'ASSALTO' MISSION.

Normal artillery is used to 'shape the battlefield' with a barrage before troops advance into the next few miles of ground permitting only a limited advance. When the pre battle bombardment is heavy enough the enemy yield that slice of ground quickly and may even have abandoned it, leaving only minefields and other booby traps. The exercise must then be repeated, time and time again, every few miles of advance. Troops are continually 'digging in' only to move on days or weeks later. Each time the advance stops the enemy have time to lay a new minefield and place new booby traps. The number of allied troops killed and wounded per mile of advance is high even though the enemy may abandon many slices of ground in many small steps. Mobile warfare stops, the campaign becomes a war of attrition, threatening loss of public support and allied co-coalition break down.

First in Italy, and then in Germany, military strategists began to question this pattern of warfare, which had developed during WW1, and which today is described as Land-Air War. Some forward thinkers began to call for the reverse strategy which eventually became known as Air-Land War.

Air-Land warfare requires large fleets of Assalto aeroplanes to function as ultra long range battlefield artillery. The purpose of Assalto aircraft is to 'shape the rest of the battlefield' beyond the range of heavy artillery, or in the event of amphibious operations, beyond the range of Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). The new assalto assets would impose upon the enemy what the German propaganda machine soon characterised as 'Drang und Sturm', (Shock and Awe), across a very much larger swathe of enemy territory. In the new doctrine of Air-Land War the area subjected to 'shock and awe' would extend far beyond the 'forward line of troops' (FLOT) before the next sweeping advance, (or amphibious assault), into the region that had been subjected to 'shock and awe' even began. Those who proposed this new theory of warfare claimed that enemy resistance would collapse over a wide area allowing huge sweeping advances with much lower allied troop casualties (and densities) per mile, leading to much shorter campaigns.

The assalto mission / role was the subject of intense arguments. Many strategists believed that the role should not even exist, whilst other strategists could not agree the optimum type of aircraft to perform the mission. Understanding the different roles of different combat aircraft is hampered by the differences in the way identical roles were designated in different nations and different languages.

The Italian designation 'Assalto' (assault) translates into German as 'Sturmkampf'. Whilst Italy originated and persevered with the whole idea of 'air assault' against distant ground targets using 'conventional' aircraft Germany made the mistake of believing that sturmkampf could only be achieved by sturzkampf (dive bombing). Dive bombing is explicitly an attack conducted down a glideslope of (about) minus 90 degrees. Germany acquired only aircraft which had sturzkampf capability to perform the assalto / sturmkampf mission, but 'dive bombing' (sturzkampf) when interpreted correctly is not a necessary component of 'precision assault bombing' and as we shall see it was the Breda 65 which proved German belief in the need for sturzkampf (official abbreviation = 'stuka') capability was mistaken.

Air assault is not employed against strategic targets. The closest British designation to assalto was 'tactical day bomber', but that is much less precise than 'assalto'. An assalto is heavily optimised to attack enemy communications, supply depots, and strong points far beyond the FLOT. Assalto attack *before* the next troop advance begins. They may need to shape the battlefield over a wide area for many days or weeks before Air Force commanders *allow* the next sweeping advance by land forces to begin.

Not surprisingly this new thinking was very unpopular with the Army generals of many nations who wanted to keep 'air forces' as just an Army Corps under their command operating in support of land forces, not spearheading each advance with the Army in the supporting role. This was an argument that British Army generals had already lost when the RAF was created in April 1918. It was an argument that Italian Army generals were losing during the 1930s, and German Army generals would soon be overruled too. In the US Army the generals would win for a while longer, and in the USSR they would win outright, but the new advanced Italian and German military thinking soon reached Japan.


ARMY CO-OPERATION = SCHLACHTKAMPF = CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.

We must not confuse the concept of 'aerial assault', against targets far beyond the 'front line' during the days (or weeks, or months), before a land battle, with the doctrine of 'close air support' (CAS) which is a mission flown only just beyond the FLOT, just before or during a land battle. The enemy command and control network along with the logistics network must be assaulted far beyond the FLOT, whether allied or enemy forces are attacking.

The aeroplanes designed and procured for 'deep penetration assault' and 'close air support' should be different. An 'assalto' is the doctrinal opposite of any aeroplane designed to provide close air support (CAS) to any Army. The role is different, the bombs are different, their combat endurance is different, and their combat radius is different.

When the USAAC was just another Army Corps anyone who believed in the new European theories of Air-Land war was quickly slapped down and sidelined. The USAAC aircraft designation A- for Attack therefore had nothing to do with the new Assalto doctrine being evolved in Europe. USAAC 'Attack' aircraft were classified as Army Co-operation aircraft by the RAF, as Schlachtkampf by the Luftwaffe, and as Sturmovikii by the Soviet Air Force. They existed to support an Army during Land-Air warfare, never needing to venture far beyond the FLOT. The new doctrine of 'aerial assault' had different and more distant targets and the new Italian doctrine changed how wars were fought.

Most confusingly of all the 'schlachtkampf' = 'attack' = CAS role translates into Spanish as 'asalto', (note the single S). So in the relevant time frame across Spain we have Italian 'Assalto' (note the double S), crewed by Italians, which are deep strike assets based alongside 'Asalto', crewed by Spaniards, which are CAS assets operating only over the FLOT after a land battle had begun. Even at the time this was so confusing that Spanish assets officially designated as 'Asalto' were more frequently referred to as 'Cadena' (Spanish = chain) assets (see later).

Schlachtkampf = Cadena = Asalto = Attack = Sturmovikii designations relate to aircraft designed, (or just tasked), to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to allied troops at the FLOT *during* a battle. By contrast assalto = sturmkampf = tactical day bombers operate far beyond the FLOT before and after a land battle begins. During a land battle, whether the result was allied land advance or retreat, assalti were still employed as tactical day bombers attacking enemy Main Supply Routes (MSRs), and their choke points, far beyond the FLOT.

Most nations concluded that dive bombing was a capability needed only by naval air power, whether or not naval air power was land based. That 'political' choice caused most other nations to reject the German theory of superiority of 'dive bombing' (sturzkampf) as a component of the assalto (sturmkampf) mission. The German propaganda machine would soon invent a new term which summarised the (supposed) overwhelming advantages of Air-Land War in a single word.


BLITZKRIEG!

The propaganda term blitzkrieg as a 'brand name' for Air-Land War was invented in Germany during the Spanish Civil War, but the concept was Italian and the earliest assalto aircraft were Italian. The inventor of the assalto / blitzkrieg concept was Colonel Amedeo Mecozzi. By about 1933 he had slowly evolved proposals which amounted to the concept of blitzkrieg. During blitzkrieg a huge and deep battlefield is 'shaped' using 'shock and awe' which can only be delivered and achieved by 'air assault'. Once the enemy are are sufficiently 'shocked' by tactical air power, the Army exploits that shocked state using rapid mechanised advance, supported by motorised infantry. Tanks mop up any local pockets of resistance while infantry process the many enemy personnel who wish to surrender rather than face further air assault.

The primary targets for assalto aircraft were enemy Command, Control and Communications (C3) capability beyond the FLOT. Especially any type of HQ and associated radio / wireless transmitters, but identifying the location of such targets was difficult, because they did not remain in fixed locations, and few such targets were available. The secondary targets were defensive strong points far beyond the FLOT which would be encountered during the next sweeping land advance. These were easy to identify and in Spain they made up most of the monthly target lists. However many targets on any assalto target list were tertiary targets of which there were a huge number. These related to enemy supply and logistics. Especially choke points in the Main Supply Route (MSR) system, including bridges, supply depots, major road and rail junctions, railway stations, railway depots, ports, and terrestrial transport vehicles of all kinds which assembled at those choke points.

The scope of each sweeping blitzkrieg advance, (the depth of battlefield which could be shaped), was limited by the combat radius of the assalto aircraft which would be employed to shape it. The supply choke points for the next Blitzkrieg objective always lie beyond that objective and must be subjected to destruction else continuous assault. Mecozzi concluded that 'assaltatori' must be capable of attacking targets 300Km (160 miles) beyond the current FLOT. Since the airfields closest to the FLOT must be allocated to air superiority fighters and to short range CAS assets, Mecozzi concluded that assalto squadrons would need to be based on less desirable airfields up to 40 miles behind the FLOT. 'Assaltatori' would therefore need to strike targets 200 miles from their base.

It was an absolute assumption of the new blitzkrieg doctrine that air superiority fighters would *not* escort 'assaltatori' to those targets. Partly because the primary role of fighters was air defence over and behind the FLOT, partly because their secondary role was CAS at the FLOT operating as 'fighter-bombers', but mostly because fighters *simply did not have the necessary combat radius*. Those Italian conclusions were gradually adopted by more and more nations.

The assalto mission is a very precise mission type, defined by Mecozzi in the terms above, which flourished during a very specific period of aviation history. It was invented in Italy in the early 1930s. It was trialled and evolved in Spain in the late 1930s, and continued to have combat utility wherever air defence beyond the relevant FLOT lacked radar based and appropriately integrated Command, Control and Communication (C3) capability. Blitzkrieg failed as a concept once the enemy on a given front deployed an adequate integrated air defence system on that front. Consequently it failed completely and spectacularly during the 'Battle of Britain' in the summer of 1940, even though it enjoyed huge success before and long after that campaign in areas without the necessary integrated C3 capability.

The first 'assalto' designed to the specification set by Mecozzi was the 'Assalto Pallavicino 1' designed by Cesare Pallavicino and manufactured by Caproni. The prototype flew in April 1934 and series production aircraft equipped eight squadriglie of the Regia Aeronautica (RA) from about January 1936 onwards. The Caproni A.P.1 was already a monoplane with Vmax = 188 KTAS when the closest RAF equivalent was the Hawker Hind biplane with Vmax = 162 KTAS, and when the fastest fighter in the RAF was the Gloster Gauntlet biplane with Vmax = 200 KTAS. The Caproni A.P.1 monoplane assalto was fast, but it wasn't fast enough!

Consequently the aeroplane most used to trial early theories of Blitzkrieg under combat conditions in Spain was the only slightly later Breda 65. The Ba 65 was far from being a great aeroplane, but it was an important aeroplane nevertheless. The Ba 65 was used to test and develop the tactics, as well as the strategy of blitzkrieg (Air-Land War). As we shall see it proved first that attacking hard targets by VFR navigation and low level overflight of the target was not a viable solution, but then also proved that dive bombing (sturzkampf) was not a necessary solution.


THE QUICK (SCHNELL) BOMBER (SB) CONCEPT.

During the early 1930s the possibility of a multi engined 'schnell bomber' that required neither defensive armament, nor fighter escort, and which could penetrate *unescorted* up to 300Km (160 miles) into areas of enemy air superiority by day was a very hot topic. A minority of strategists were open minded enough to grasp that in the future Air Forces would spearhead each attack with the Army only in the supporting role, but they could not agree whether assalti should be multi engined. Nobody outside the Soviet Union had any real confidence they could make the multi engined Schnell Bomber (Skorostnoi Bombardirovshcick = SB ) concept work.


SOVIET SUPREMACY by land and air.

In the relevant time frame, in the wake of the 'Wall Street Crash' the new world military super power was the Soviet Union by a huge margin. Its land based armed forces dwarfed those of other nations and their equipment was easily superior too. The USSR had no doubts about the schnell bomber (Skorostnoi Bombardirovshcick = SB )concept and it was the Soviet Union which achieved the capability first.

The Soviet military complex never developed a belief in blitzkrieg. They never openly specified or acquired assalto assets because they lacked the doctrine, but in practice they did not lack the capability. What the Soviet Air force described as a Skorostnoi Bombardirovshcick (SB) was an assalto by another name capable of flying the same mission profile and role. Like the RAF the Soviet Air Force acquired aircraft which could fly the assalto mission, without ever explicitly adopting the doctrine which required the mission. Throughout the 1930s the US Army was able to prevent that advance in the United States, where a doomed alternative doctrine of 'Flying Fortresses' that it was wrongly believed would need no fighter escort was being evolved.

The series production Tupolev SB-2 Katiuska, powered by a pair of licence built 750hp Hispano Suiza HS12 engines (Vmax = 212 KTAS), entered squadron service with the Soviet Air Force in December 1935. Soviet strategists had made a clear and logical choice. They concluded that the only way a tactical day bomber could possibly perform its mission was to be fast enough to evade interception. That logic required two engines not one. Any SB must have at least 1500hp to evade a 750hp interceptor in combat during the next few years. Of course any SB had to be a monoplane with retractable gear. Soon in mass production at a rate of thirteen per day the Soviet Air Force suddenly had thousands of schnell bombers which were much faster than the fastest interceptors (bomber destroyer = zerstorer), of any other nation and much faster than the fastest fighters (jaeger = air superiority fighter) of any other nation. During 1936 the Soviet Union, which had not adopted assalto doctrine, was the only nation that could deliver it!


BRITISH RESPONSE.

The deployment of the world beating and extremely numerous Tupolev SB-2 Katiuska required a response. In Britain it was copied and mass produced as the 2 x 840hp Bristol Blenheim (Vmax = 226 KTAS) which entered squadron service with the RAF fourteen months later in January 1937. The Gloster Gladiator (Vmax = 220 KTAS) fighter (Jaeger) entered squadron service the same month. Not for the first time the best interceptors and fighters in the RAF could not keep up with the RAF's best tactical day bombers and they had even less hope of keeping up with the tactical day bombers (Assalti) of potential enemy nations. By January 1937 the original 2 x 750hp Tupolev SB-2 was already being replaced by the 2 x 960hp SB-2bis (Vmax = 243 KTAS).

For the USSR and the British Empire the debate was over. Schnell bombers existed and could strike targets 300 Km (160 miles) beyond the enemy FLOT *unescorted* even where enemy air superiority fighters had theoretical air superiority, *provided the C3 capability to ensure interception was lacking*.

However there was a problem with SB, whether Tupolev or Bristol. The accuracy of their day bombing from medium level, (safely above the lethal enemy tactical Flak envelope), was poor. They could hit a bridge sized target 160 miles beyond the FLOT, supplying the enemy bridgehead and breakout, with tiny casualty rates to aircrew, but only by dropping a huge number of bombs, from a huge number of aircraft. The possibility existed that Italian and German strategists were 'more correct' and that fewer and smaller single engined tactical day bombers operating as assalti, should aim fewer bombs more accurately from a descending attack, which terminated inside the enemy tactical Flak envelope, with larger aircraft percent losses, but lower absolute losses.

The British had already decided to hedge their bets. The RAF deployed the powerful twin engined Bristol Blenheim schnell bomber (Vmax = 226 KTAS) in January 1937 and then almost immediately they deployed the single engined Fairey Battle (Vmax = 209 KTAS) in March 1937.

Just like the Blenheim the Battle was multi role. It was also a three crew medium level, deep penetration, full IFR, night bomber, (always with black underside matching its primary role), but it was also required to fly unescorted daylight assalto high angle precision bombing missions in areas of enemy air superiority. The Battle's four bomb cells were in the inner wings, outside the airscrew arc. Each contained a 250lb bomb mounted on a dive bomber style bomb crutch which swung down below the bays holding the bomb parallel to the attack run and permitting high angle dive release.

History would show that neither the Fairey Battle nor it less capable German alternative the Junkers Ju 87 was actually 'schnell' enough to fly the assalto mission. Without heavy air superiority fighter top cover and close escort both would be slaughtered in large numbers when attempting the assalto mission. All 'tactical day bombers' which were just not 'schnell' enough were in reality restricted to the tiny and inadequate combat radius of their own air force's air superiority fighters (jaegers).


STEALTH BOMBERS.

Before radar early warning and tracking existed every night bomber was a stealth bomber. Stealth bombers do not need to be schnell bombers. The assalto role existed to attack all necessary *tactical* targets beyond the fighter bomber combat radius by day whilst stealth bombers attacked all deeper targets, and closer strategic targets, by night.

Truly deep penetration to attack strategic targets required stealth bombing, all of which was night bombing. In the United States some generals dreamed of 'Flying Fortresses' which would be able make deep strategic unescorted penetrations by day, but in due course that daydream was easily shattered by the Luftwaffe. All such missions had to be escorted by fighters to avoid wholesale slaughter of the 'flying fortresses' however heavy the defensive firepower of heavy day bombers.

Prior to WW2 that reality was clearly understood only in Britain. The RAF stopped procuring bomber assets that could not also fly deep stealth bomber penetrations against strategic targets at night. Stealth bombing became the primary role of even single engined RAF bombers like the Fairey Battle. Other nations continued to procure daylight only 'assaltatori' with no strategic role and no stealth navigation capability at all.


SCHNELL!, SCHNELL!, SCHNELL!

Mecozzi's vision required a huge fleet of 'assaltatori' to deliver blitzkrieg. It was always part of that vision that they must be truly 'schnell' even if that compromised crew complement, IFR navigation capability, night bombing capability, and even bombload. An 'assaltatore' must be 'schnell enough' to shape the tactical battlefield up to 300Km (160 miles) beyond the FLOT *without escort* because it must operate far beyond the combat radius of contemporary air superiority fighters.


SIZE MATTERS.

The Attack = Army Co-operation = Cadena = Schlachtkampf = sturmoviki = CAS mission could be performed by air superiority fighters relegated to the 'fighter-bomber' role. Those tiny fighters could carry tiny bombs that were just big enough to destroy tanks and similar sized targets. They would provide most of any CAS at the FLOT. However those fighter-bombers could not carry bombs that would bust bridges, or defensive strong points. Nor were those tiny, (usually 10kg), bombs large enough to destroy a road junction. They made a crater a truck could drive around, even on a road in a deep mountain pass, or beside a cliff edge. The advantage of tiny bombs was that they could be delivered accurately by just overflying the target in level flight at very low level. Their tiny blast radius was too small to endanger the aeroplane which dropped them. Of course such point blank 'lay down' attacks nevertheless caused very high aircraft losses to light Flak and small arms fire.

When the 'Boys Big Book of Wonderplanes' tells us that a strike aircraft could lift one thousand pounds of bombs it misses the point in two ways. It fails to explain how tiny the combat radius will be after we drain all the fuel we must drain to lift that propaganda payload; and it does not tell us whether the biggest bomb that will fit inside the bomb bay(s), or which can be hung from a single pylon, is a bomb big enough to bust even a pontoon bridge, or penetrate a simple prepared underground infantry 'dugout' being used as a local command post.

An 'assaltatore' is neither a variety of fighter-bomber (jagdbomber), nor a variety of Army Co-operation aircraft (schlachtkampf). An 'assaltatore' must deliver much bigger individual bombs than are required for those missions even if its maximum bombload is compromised by the requirement to be truly schnell and to strike targets 160 miles beyond the FLOT and 200 miles from its base. The standard 100Kg bomb carried by the Ba 65 was *ten times bigger* than the standard 10Kg bomb carried by a 1930s fighter-bomber.


THE INTERCEPTOR (ZERSTORER) ROLE.

Just as a tactical day bomber (sturmkampf) is not a variety of army co-operation aeroplane (schlachtkampf), similarly an interceptor (zerstorer) is not a variety air superiority fighter (jaeger). Interceptors have no need to be agile and must not be confused with fighters. Interceptors lack the agility to defeat fighters. Interceptors exist to attack unescorted bombers.

Colonel Mecozzi's vision of a single engined schnell bomber (assaltatore), just large enough to carry several 100Kg bombs, was soon being adulterated in Italy by Regia Aeronautica generals who believed that the new assalto aircraft should be multi role and should also be allocated the interceptor role. Mecozzi was able to resist calls to develop a single seat version of the Caproni A.P.1, which would be as much interceptor as tactical day bomber, but he was unable to prevent the next generation of assalto aircraft designed by Antonio Parano and Giuseppe Panzeri, (to be built by Breda), from being designed as dual role single seat tactical day bombers and bomber interceptors.

The Regia Aeronautica generals overruled Colonel Mecozzi at design time and insisted that the Ba 65 be a single seater so that it was light enough, and could climb fast enough, to equip interceptor squadrons, but even they never imagined it would be agile enough to operate as a fighter. The idea was deeply flawed. Just as single engined 'assaltatore' were in reality never fast enough to evade single engined monoplane interceptors, they were also never fast enough to intercept enemy twin engined monoplane bombers. We must not make the mistake of thinking that the Ba 65 was ever assigned the air superiority fighter role just because it was a single seater. The Ba 65 Series I would eventually be relegated to interceptor duties, but it was quite incapable of serving in the fighter role.


ROLE CONFUSION.

Nobody outside Germany believed that the assalto mission required dive bombing. The term 'dive bombing' is much abused by aircraft enthusiasts and journalists alike and that leads to all kinds of confusion so I will try to illuminate some of the issues involved.

As explained and demonstrated within the earlier Ansaldo SVA 5 release many combat biplanes have such a high co-efficient of profile drag (Cdp) that even in a full power vertical dive they reach a 'terminal velocity', (actually terminal profile drag), which is insufficient to cause structural failure, (terminal IAS is far below IAS = Vne). Their heavily braced G load structural limits greatly exceed those of their pilot and the only way to break them is to dive them into terrain, (potentially after pilot G induced loss of consciousness (GLOC).

Having much lower Cdp most monoplanes with retractable landing gear and cantilever wings have a much higher theoretical 'terminal velocity', but in practice most reach IAS > Vne and suffer structural failure long before they reach their purely theoretical 'terminal velocity'. Having low Cdp they accelerate to structural failure (beyond IAS = Vne) much sooner. Dive bombing in monoplanes without dive brakes to *reduce* the profile drag (IAS) impacting the airframe at the time of weapon release is impossible. They suffer premature structural failure, else the pilot lacks the strength to bench press the elevators down into the profile drag with which he is abusing them and he loses his unguided weapon air to ground fire control solution.

A few aircraft types procured explicitly for the assalto mission, including the Ju 87, also had dive brakes which greatly *reduced* the profile drag (IAS) abuse during a prolonged dive. This gave them an additional *sturzkampf* capability that was only ever significantly useful when attacking armoured ships and certain types of bunker or fortress using 'bunker busting' bombs, because the angle of bomb strike obliquity must then be 90 degrees to maximise penetration. In nations with full spectrum naval surface fleet capability sturzkampf (vertical dive bombers) belonged aboard their aircraft carriers and were operated by their navies, even when sturzkampf assets were mostly land based, (e.g. by the Aeronavale in France). The USN, RN and IJN all procured sturzkampf for the only major role in which that capability had additional combat utility.

The existence of sturzkampf capability in the Luftwaffe was a consequence of contemporary German leadership failure to understand the primary role of US Navy sturzkampf which Udet falsely promoted as providing a superior doctrine to Sturmkampf. Udet's political connections allowed him to impose procurement choices which operational elements of the Luftwaffe did their best to reject. As we shall see Udet's theories did not stand up to combat testing in Spain, but his appointment as Luftwaffe General for Procurement (Generalluftzeugmeister) allowed him to impose his theories.

Mecozzi vision of 'air assault' never envisaged anything other than level flight bombing of tactical targets with large bombs or lay down attacks using 'bomblets'. His vision of an 'assaltatore' was a single engine schnell bomber able to evade enemy interceptors by speed alone and which would bomb its tactical targets in level flight; because in order to be truly 'schnell' all of its bombs would need to be carried internally to minimise co-efficient of profile drag (Cdp).

That was the major flaw in Mecozzi's vision. Schnell bombers which cannot employ the doctrine known as 'high angle bombing', (which must not be confused with dive bombing), cannot bomb accurately with large bombs. Consequently vast numbers of 'assaltatori' were required to destroy any given target. We shall examine in detail why Udet's belief that this flaw in Mecozzi's doctrine could only be rectified by dive bombing was false. Nevertheless a single engined assalto *must* be capable of high angle bomb delivery using a parallax sight to aim its very limited bomb load as part of a 'fire control solution', (see 'How to survive flying the Ba 65'.txt).

German assalto as imposed by Udet was even more deeply flawed. The first Luftwaffe 'Stuka' imposed by Udet was the Henschel Hs 123 biplane. It lacked both the speed and range to achieve the assalto mission requirements which are at the heart of blitzkrieg doctrine. Sturzkampf (dive bombing) capability had pointlessly been incorporated and had caused a design with excessive Cdp. Those stuka biplanes had to be very quickly relegated to only schlachtkampf (CAS) duties at the FLOT. Their replacement, the monoplane Ju 87, was also heavily compromised by the unnecessary requirement for vertical dive bombing (sturzkampf). It lacked adequate speed too and just like the Fairey Battle it required heavy fighter escort and top cover to survive in enemy airspace with up to date C3.

The Breda 65 was far from being the perfect tactical day bomber. It was compromised by the requirement to carry all of its bombs internally, and hanging vertically in a tiny bomb bay. It was compromised by the design time requirement to double up as a single seat interceptor, but nevertheless only the RAF's Fairy Battle was superior in the assalto role when the Ba 65 Series I also achieved full squadron deployment during the spring of 1937.


FRAGMENTATION GRENADES - 'CLUSTER MUNITIONS'.

Mecozzi's vision required assalto assets to destroy, (not just damage), soft targets as well as hard targets. For reasons explained within 'How to survive flying the Ba 65', strafing with machine guns does not deliver that requirement. The Ba 65 was designed from the outset to deliver devastating firepower in a local kill zone via a 'lay down' attack with 'cluster munitions'. How to simulate all relevant doctrines is explained in detail within 'How to survive flying the Ba 65'.

The Ba 65 specification required the internal weapons bay to house two different 'weapon packs'. One of these housed four grenade dispensers for anti personnel, (anti gun crew), and anti soft vehicle use during assalto missions. During such sorties the normal bomb bay doors were removed and replaced by a fixed cover with four large holes below the grenade dispensers.

The Ba 65 was a flexible weapon platform, able to attack with multiple weapon systems, suited to different targets, and suited to the threat environment around distant tactical targets, but all relevant targets lay far beyond the FLOT. By 1940 the 2Kg fragmentation grenade dispensers had been adapted to also dispense both 2Kg incendiaries and 2Kg anti vehicle mines.

The original fragmentation grenades were too small to have combat utility against hard (armoured) targets such as light tanks. The anti tank mission is a support mission flown at the FLOT, not an assault mission flown up to 160 miles beyond the FLOT. Nobody expected 'assaltatori' to fly CAS missions of any kind, let alone anti tank missions, and all Ba 65s were delivered without the external bomb racks or release mechanisms which are required by CAS assets.


ADVANTAGES OF HIGH ANGLE ATTACK.

It was soon obvious that the number of sorties required to obtain a single hit on a defensive strong point (dugout) or pontoon bridge was extremely high when single engined aircraft were tasked with that mission. After brave, but crazy, attempts to deploy 'large' bombs via lay down attacks in Spain caused unacceptable aircraft loss rates, Ba 65 squadron commanders grasped that the omission of external bomb racks was a huge error and ordered them to be fitted after delivery so that the Ba 65 could emulate the 'high angle attack' capability of the Fairey Battle.

In the era of unguided weapons external and parallel bomb carriage at time of release was essential to permit the 'high angle' precision bomb aiming needed to directly hit a command post or pontoon bridge with a 'large' bomb. For reasons explained elsewhere the attack on the primary target is flown down a precisely minus 30 degrees glideslope. During a high angle assalto attack down a minus 30 degree glideslope the bombs are released closer to the target than during a (near) vertical sturzkampf attack, but exposure to the lethal small arms defence envelope of the target is nevertheless minimised. The relevant doctrines are explained in full within 'How to survive flying the Ba 65' so that we can learn and practice the relevant air assault skills within MSFS.

In children's video games bombs detonate regardless of angle of strike. In real life bombs ricochet just like bullets. If a real bomb strikes grass or dirt when less than about 20 degrees nose down it just bounces. The impact is nevertheless quite likely to distort the fusing mechanism so that it will never work. The bomb becomes yet another unexploded bomb that will never explode. If a real bomb strikes a hard surface like concrete, tarmac, or armour at less than about 40 degrees nose down it just bounces and distorts more, or may even break up without exploding. Releasing an external bomb carried parallel to the aeroplane as it travels down a minus 30 degree glideslope allows the bomb to reach minus 40 degrees pitch before it strikes the target.

In children's video games bombs also detonate regardless of time in flight. In real life bombs fail to arm if released too late, or with too little profile drag (IAS). The little propeller, (on the tail of Italian bombs), is only unlocked at time of release, and then it has to be windmilled fast enough, (by high enough IAS), and long enough, to arm (release) the firing pin of the bomb. The bomb needs to be in flight for several seconds else it will never arm and will never detonate. If the bomb is released from an aeroplane diving at a speed of more than 100 metres per second (330 feet per second), the fire control solution must be obtained, and the bomb released, no later than about 400 metres (1300 feet) and four seconds before bomb impact.

When executed correctly a 'high angle' bombing attack down a minus 30 degree glideslope with 'large' bombs delivers the same accuracy as a 'dive' bombing attack down a minus 90 degree glideslope. The high angle attack developed during WW1 had already made dive bombing irrelevant as a doctrine for attacking immobile land targets, even before dive bombing was invented, (also during WW1). Many aircraft can neither dive bomb, nor high angle bomb. Mostly because internal bombs cannot be launched from a steep dive, (again widely ignored in children's video games), and partly due to profile drag issues which will be explained fully in 'How to survive flying the Ba65'.


DIVE BOMBING allows BLITZKRIEG, but REQUIRES SITZKRIEG.

Dive bombing (sturzkampf) is a flawed doctrine when deployed against immobile land targets. When an aeroplane attacks a target (nearly) vertically, in order to have sufficient *time* to identify targets and acquire a valid fire control solution it must enter the dive at great height. A dive bomber ace might be able to obtain a fire control solution diving from an attack pattern at 1500 metres but most dive bomber pilots needed to begin their dive from as much as 3000 metres above the target. Unlike children's video games, in real life cloud intervenes on many days in Europe. The minus 30 degree glideslope high angle attack doctrine is designed to be compatible with the cloud base over Europe on many more days, and for a much greater part of each year.

German blitzkrieg doctrine became far too dependent on sturzkampf and thus far to dependent on lovely weather with a very high cloud base. This required very long periods of 'Sitzkrieg' (Phoney War) every year in between short periods of summer Blitzkrieg. A Blitzkrieg (Air-Land War) against Poland was possible in September 1939, but then there had to be a long sitzkrieg. The next German blitzkrieg could only resume in May 1940 and the 'Battle of Britain' had to be abandoned before October 1940. Then another long sitzkrieg until the summer of 1941 when another blitzkrieg could resume.

Of course the German army could fight old fashioned Land-Air War campaigns outside the summer, but only the Luftwaffe could achieve blitzkrieg, and despite all the propaganda to the contrary the Luftwaffe had acquired the wrong kind of sturmkampf. When the anticipated 1941 sweeping summer blitzkrieg advance all the way to Moscow before winter failed, and the Red Army were disinclined to play at Sitzkrieg from October 1941 to May 1942, German forces suffered very badly whilst attempting Land-Air war against a much bigger nation, much better prepared, and much better equipped, for that 'out of date' variety of warfare. Germany had deliberately neglected schlachtkampf = sturmovikii weapon platforms and related weapon systems. The 'backward' Soviet Union had not!

Dive bombing by aeroplanes continued to be a superior doctrine for attacks on armoured ships, but only until the introduction of guided anti ship weapons by the Luftwaffe in 1943. After that dive bombing was a superior doctrine only against heavily armoured ships, protected by effective anti torpedo defences. If dive bombing of immobile land targets had actually provided the combat utility claimed by Udet, then sturzkampf capability would have been designed into relevant combat aircraft, on both side of the 'iron curtain' after WW2. Udet's theories were held in low regard outside Germany throughout WW2 where combat experience proved they were flawed and not worth adopting.


CADENA ATTACK (SPANISH = CHAIN ATTACK)

The relegation, of fighters to CAS had begun during WW1. It was soon clear that single crew aircraft could only suppress ground fire adequately while inbound and strafing the target area. They were vulnerable during egress as they had no rear gunner to suppress ground fire. Germany soon grasped that their jaegers (D class flugzeug) should only strafe from stand off range, (German strafe = English punish), and should not continue the minus 30 degree high angle dive to carry out a lay down attack with tiny bombs. The extra enemy casualties achieved by overflying the target to attack with tiny bombs at point blank range were insufficient to justify the extra aircraft and aircrew losses.

Germany soon created two different types of dedicated schlachtkampf designated as CL class (unarmoured) and J class (armoured) flugzeug with two crew to solve that problem. They could make high angle attacks down 30 degree glideslopes and their rear gunner could suppress ground fire during egress, while armoured J class schlachtkampf could deflect low calibre hits. Those J class schlachtkampf = sturmovikii which were soon serving with the Polish Air Force made a huge impression on the Soviet Army as Poland invaded the Ukraine after WW1 and the Soviet Air force would later acquire the best sturmovikii.

However as tanks proliferated after WW1, no army created or deployed adequate infantry portable anti tank capability. It became a given that the anti tank mission would be a schlachtkampf = sturmovikii = CAS mission. Almost all air forces procured unarmoured schlachtkampf (CL class) aircraft to perform CAS, but they never procured enough of them, and the anti tank role therefore became in part (or mainly) a single crew fighter-bomber mission.

The Spanish civil war was the next war in which tanks played a major role and even German jaegers were once again used inappropriately as ad hoc jagdbombers. New battlefield tactics to prevent excessive losses were required. The battlefield tactic that evolved was the chain (Spanish = cadena) attack. Each successive aircraft of a jadgbomber sortie began its high angle attack with a strafing run from a different direction before the prior aircraft making a lay down attack began egress. The first aircraft had to circle round to make a second high angle strafing run to 'protect' the next high angle precision bomb attack by a sturmkampf, or lay down attack by a jagdbomber, with suppressing fire.

Slowly air force after air force demonstrated that sturzkampf was not necessary to achieve either sturmkampf or schlachtkampf mission requirements. Any combat aircraft with external bombs, adequate control authority, and adequate structural integrity, to sustain only minus 30 degree glideslope dives was capable of prosecuting any target with 'high angle' precision bombing, else high velocity lay down attacks.

When expensive single crew assalto aircraft with large individual bombs like the Ba 65 were senselessly squandered in CAS attacks they had to adopt the same cadena tactics as mere jadgbombers. The Italian commanders in Spain were never stupid enough to squander Breda 65s that way, and so Ba 65 loss rates remained exceptionally low in Spain. In the context of the Spanish Civil War the Ba 65 Series II (Vmax = 229 KTAS) was just sufficiently 'schnell' to avoid interception almost all of the time. In Spain the Ba 65 was only ever assigned to assalto = sturmkampf Groups, never cadena = schlachtkampf Groups. Nor were Ba 65s ever assigned the interceptor role in Spain.

As it happens one Ba 65 did achieve a single interception, and a single air to air kill, during its four year combat career, but only by chance. Within a week or so of beginning combat operations over Spain in August 1937, while operating from Soria, and returning from an assalto sortie, Sergeant Dell'Acqua spotted a solitary unescorted government Tupolev SB-2 Katiuska carrying out a photo recce sortie over Soria aerodrome. He managed to attack unseen from below and shot it down.


SCRAMBLE NOT CAP.

Assigned only as assalto in Spain it was easy for Breda 65s to avoid being shot down by ground fire. The major threat to 'assaltatori' was interception by interceptors (zerstorer not jaeger) which had been scrambled to intercept inbound raids after visual detection. We must remember that in all relevant theatres, (to which the Ba 65 was ever committed), during the relevant time frame, there was no radar at all. Defending interceptors (if any) had to be scrambled from cold on an airfield flight line to intercept enemy aircraft detected only after they crossed the FLOT. No air force had enough air superiority fighters to fly a significant number of standing combat air patrols over or behind their own FLOT.

An air superiority fighter had no hope of intercepting a properly designed Assalto or Schnell Bomber unless those aircraft passed directly under its CAP allowing it to turn the potential energy of altitude into a brief burst of kinetic energy, making a single diving attack. The FLOT might have standing CAP, but assalti did not attack at the FLOT, and *never* crossed the FLOT at low level unless operating at the base of cloud. They never had enemy fighter CAP above them. Most lucrative assalto targets far beyond the FLOT had no CAP. The lucrative targets were just too numerous. Airfields always had (daylight) CAP and that is why airfields were rarely tasked as an assalto target. However from time to time assalto units were ordered to attack enemy airfields just beyond the FLOT, but never beyond the combat radius where they could have heavy fighter escort and top cover to engage the enemy CAP.

The design of the Ba65 Series II (Vmax = 229 KTAS) was driven by the widely held view that a 'schnell bomber', would need no fighter escort and no significant defensive firepower. Such aircraft could operate by day without fighter escort, or top cover, during high speed medium level penetrations of enemy airspace which had no radar early warning or tracking. The Ba 65 addressed that requirement and enjoyed some success flying that flight plan attack profile, but it lacked the navigational capability to locate many targets 300Km (160 miles) beyond the FLOT, and the single crew member was overworked, and lost situational awareness of all kinds, especially when not operating in a large formation.


POLIKARPOV I-16 RATA.

In the mid 1930s the undisputed world military super power, (but only on land and in the air), was the Soviet Union. It had the best bombers in huge numbers. It had the best tanks in huge numbers. It had the only paratroops and paratroop deployment aircraft in existence (in huge numbers), and it had the best interceptor in huge numbers. But in 1936, like all other interceptors, the Soviet variety had no worthwhile early warning system or command and control infrastructure to render them combat effective, wherever they were based. By 1936 the standard production version of the Polikarpov I-16 was already the Tipo 6 (Vmax = 246 KTAS) powered by the 730hp Wright Cyclone manufactured in the Soviet Union under licence.

When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936 the best interceptor in the world (730hp Polikarpov I-16 Tipo 6 Vmax = 246 KTAS) could 'just' outpace the best Schnell Bomber in the world (2 x 960hp Tupolev SB-2bis Vmax = 243 KTAS), but no other nation came close to matching Soviet military aviation supremacy or numbers deployed.

Let's pause to remember that the fastest aircraft in the USAAC is the 700hp Consolidated P-30A (interceptor) (Vmax = 238 KTAS), only fifty of which were ever built. Replacement of the pathetic 500hp Boeing P-26C (fighter) (Vmax 205 KTAS) first delivered during 1936 will not begin until 1938. It cannot even keep up with a Fairey Battle or any other modern retractable gear multi crew strike aircraft, let alone intercept them from a standing start. The 500hp Boeing P-26 was a monoplane, but it was barely faster than the Gloster Gauntlet biplane (Vmax = 200 KTAS) of 1934 and significantly slower than the 840hp Gloster Gladiator biplane (Vmax = 220 KTAS) which entered service in January 1937.

In order to understand the 1000hp Breda 65 Series II in this flight sim release, and the compromises required and made to achieve Vmax = 229 KTAS, we must understand its role, its performance envelope, which aircraft were its contemporaries, which air forces were actually prepared for war, and already had 'modern' equipment.

We need not consider the biplane air superiority fighters of the Spanish government. The Polikarpov I-15 and I-15bis Chato (Vmax = 199 KTAS) fighters shared the excellent Wright Cyclone engine of the Polikarpov I-16 Rata interceptor, but they were far too slow to trouble a Ba 65, unless a Ba 65 formation failed to spot a Chato CAP and flew directly under the holding pattern in which the Chatos were loitering (always below cloud). Only a properly designed interceptor could possibly threaten a properly designed assalto, or a properly designed schnell bomber. Air superiority fighters were no threat.

That explains why a Ba 65 was able to shoot down a Tupolev SB-2 Katiuska only once. The lone SB-2 crew photographing Soria 'knew' that the fascist insurgents had no fighters which could threaten them from below and were focussing all of their attention upwards looking for CAP diving to attack. The presence of the newly arrived Ba 65 assalto squadron at Soria, or even the performance envelope of Ba 65s, was not yet confirmed, and a single Ba 65 approaching very fast from below went undetected until too late, but only once.

The Ba 65 is an aeroplane of the 1930s, not the 1940s. In August 1937 only the UK already had integrated air defence command and control capability, but the UK still had no aeroplanes fast enough to intercept any schnell bomber, whereas the Spanish government had much better interceptors, but no worthwhile C3 capability.


KAMPF v STURMKAMPF v SCHLACHTKAMPF.

A 'medium bomber' is not an 'tactical day bomber' and neither is suited to the CAS role over the FLOT. During the 1930s USAAC designations already differentiated 'day bombers' such as the 2 x 850hp Douglas B-18 Bolo (Vmax = 187 KTAS) which could only be tasked in areas of US air superiority, or only with fighter escort in areas of enemy air superiority, from Attack = CAS assets like the Northrop A-17 Nomad which were required to perform schlachtkampf = CAS without escort, but only over the FLOT.

CAS assets dash just a few miles into enemy territory, attack and then retreat. The 187 KTAS Bolo deployed at the end of 1936 was no more capable of flying the assalto mission than the even slower 2 x 920hp Armstrong Whitworth Whitley I deployed by the RAF after the Blenheim and Battle during 1937. However the Whitley was a stealth bomber designed and optimised to operate only at night making very deep unescorted penetrations against strategic targets. Air assault by 'assaltatori' is a very specific daylight deep penetration mission with a very specific 4D profile requiring exceptionally 'schnell' aircraft.


MULTI CREW ADVANTAGE.

The provision of an Air Gunner in the 3 seat Fairey Battle, which achieved squadron deployment in March 1937, was senseless and contrary to the design doctrine, by day or night. Carriage of a Wireless Operator (WO) to update the GPS plot;

.... See 2008 Propliner Tutorial from Calclassic.com/tutorials.

and act as threat early warning observer on such operations was however wise. The Fairey Battle which achieved full squadron service just before the earliest varieties of Breda 65 was a long range deep penetration night bomber with full IFR navigation capability provided by the WO who was also a fully trained, precision bomb sight using, bomb aimer (American = Bombardier).

The contemporary Ba 65 by contrast was just an updated Ansaldo SVA 5 WW1 capability fair weather and day only weapon system with no night flying or bad weather navigation capability at all. Worse it had no bomb aiming capability at all, despite having only an internal bomb bay with bombs hung vertically by the nose. Unlike the Fairey Battle it never actually carried vertical or oblique cameras for strategic or tactical recce missions, or to fly bomb damage assessment sorties. The Breda had camera bays, but they were unoccupied because it was never issued to units with a reconnaissance role. From September 1939 to May 1940 the Fairey Battle was primarily a combat effective, and sufficiently schnell high level strategic recce asset enjoying low loss rates over Germany by day. The Ba 65 was multi role in entirely the wrong direction. Like the Ansaldo SVA 5 from WW1 it was trying to be an interceptor and an 'assaltatore' and was compromised in both roles.

Its closest American contemporary was the Northrop A-17 Nomad (Vmax = 179 KTAS), but the Nomad represented total rejection of both the schnell bomber and sturmkampf concepts by the USAAC which was still being held back by Army generals. It had massive fixed landing gear producing lots of drag, but it did have a wireless and a WO to update the GPS plot. The WO doubled up as an air gunner, but had little hope of hitting an attacking fighter. When he manned the gun his job was to suppress enemy ground fire with spaying fire during egress from a high angle attack. Like the Battle the Nomad could navigate back to base after dark and above cloud in bad weather with the WO updating the GPS plot. The Ba 65 could not.

Of these three only the Battle could bomb autonomously from medium level, or at night. Only the Battle had precision bomb aiming equipment and a fully trained bomb aimer. The Battle pilot and the Nomad pilot did not need to be a 'jack of all trades' and did not need eyes in the back of their heads. Having rear facing aircrew massively increased crew situational awareness of threats and when to fly break turns almost to GLOC to 'engage defensive' against those threats. The rear gunner could spray suppressing fire into the threat area during low level egress, or during fighter attack. He was not expected to hit anything with a hand held rear gun. Its role was wholly suppressive and deterrent. Monoplanes generated profile drag (IAS) that was far too high to allow accurate aiming of hand trained weapons. That required turrets with rigid gun mounts for gun training and some Breda 65s would acquire them (see later).

Unlike the Nomad, both the Ba 65 and the Battle had comparatively fragile and failure prone retractable gear which confined them to operating from carefully prepared, or peacetime, airfields which were soon far behind the lines when the front line moved forward quickly during blitzkrieg. The USAAC Nomad was very slow, and a very wide range of fighters, including almost all biplane fighters could intercept it easily. That prevented the A-17 Nomad from operating as an assalto even in 1936. We will study the foreign clones of the A-17 Nomad later.


SCHNELL BOMBERS SOON DOMINATE.

We cannot understand the failure of the Ba 65 to achieve autonomous operation as an assalto in Spain without grasping how the assalto role would develop and be wholly superseded by twin engined schnell bombers over the six years after the Spanish Civil War began in 1936. The Spanish Civil War provided the Tupolev SB-2, (and any Tupolev clones), the opportunity to demonstrate its superior combat utility compared to single engined 'assaltatori'. The superiority of the Tupolev SB-2 over all rivals was hugely resented everywhere outside the USSR and every attempt was made by propagandists in Berlin, Rome, London and Washington to pretend it did not even exist. Modern media publishers of all kinds are far too lazy to differentiate propaganda from truth and endlessly regurgitate the propaganda newsreels and newspaper articles of the day as though they were something other than deliberate disinformation.

During the 1930s no English speaking media boss, whether originating from the UK or the US, could stomach the reality that the USSR had become the world land and air military superpower. They desperately needed to pretend that the superb schnell bombers employed by the Spanish government were 'Martin Bombers' by which they meant the obsolete 2 x 775hp Martin B-10B (Vmax = 185 KTAS), which was the backbone of the puny USAAC bomber forces until the arrival of the (only two KTAS faster) Douglas B-18 Bolo in late 1936.

The British cloned the SB-2 as fast as they could to create the Blenheim deployed in January 1937 and for a while even though Blenheim Vmax = 226 KTAS was much slower than SB-2bis Vmax = 242 KTAS, the Blenheim was 'just schnell enough'. The other European powers all understood the superiority of the Soviet SB even as they daily denied it. Some like Italy and Germany also cloned the Tupolev (see later), but France decided not only to clone the Tupolev SB-2 in France, but also to order Tupolev clones, mass produced quickly by US manufacturers.

Both Martin and Douglas tried to persuade the US Army to grasp the new reality. Both cloned the Tupolev Katiuska and offered their updated and superior clones to replace the Northrop A-17 Nomad, but the generals of the US Army were having none of it. They had no intention of adopting Air-Land war and saw no reason to acquire any kind of assalto asset. Instead they ordered a retractable gear version of the A-17 as the 825hp A-17A (Vmax = 191 KTAS). It was a disastrous US purchase, but it gave France the opportunity to leap ahead of everybody else.


FRENCH ADVANTAGE.

After the USAAC rejected both the 2 x 1200hp Douglas A-20 Boston (Vmax = 257 KTAS) and the 2 x 1200hp Martin A-22 Maryland (Vmax = 242 KTAS) in favour of the much less capable 1 x 825hp Northrop A-17A (Vmax = 191 KTAS), France ordered both American twin engined SB clones in large numbers for 1939-40 delivery, which duly happened. Both types entered squadron service in the French Air Force early in 1940.

Hundreds of A-20 Bostons and A-22 Marylands were manufactured for France during the late 1930s and those that had not been delivered to France by the time France surrendered in June 1940 were purchased by Britain for late 1940 delivery and were much needed by the RAF and SAAF in the North African assalto role. The A-20 and the A-22 had normal bombloads of 1100 to 1500 pounds and would serve mostly with the 'British' Desert Air Force flying assalto missions from Egypt against Italian supply depots and main supply routes in Libya from late 1940; whilst 229 KTAS Ba 65s with puny normal 440lb bombloads flew Assalto missions more slowly in the opposite direction across North Africa.

It was not until mid 1939 that the USAAC grasped that France was right and began to tag A-20A Boston orders onto the end of the long French and British Douglas A-20 production run. From January 1940 only France had the best assalto ' schnell bombers, but of course from June 1940 those US supplied aircraft were serving with Axis (Vichy) forces in North Africa and Asia. Those Vichy French forces and US supplied aircraft would soon be in action against British forces right across Africa and the Middle East.

The USAAC much later substituted the Wright R-2600 for the P&W R-1830 in their 2 x 1600hp A-20A Bostons (Vmax = 302 KTAS), but they did not reach USAAC forces until very late 1941 and did not fly a combat mission with US forces until May 1942, by when the 2 x 1390hp de Havilland Mosquito B.IV (Vmax = 330 KTAS) was in squadron service with the RAF.

The single engine, single crew, 'assalto' specified by Mecozzi was an error of judgement. Even two or three crew single engine Assalto like the Ju87 and Battle were errors of judgement. With only one engine they were all too slow and their useful load was also simply too small. With any significant bombload the combat radius of a single engine assalto that was fast enough to fly the mission unescorted was inadequate.


NAVY and MARINE DOCTRINE.

In the USAAC the evolution of A- (Attack) class aircraft from only CAS capable to also assault mission capable from 1942 was decisive and with little backsliding. The USAAC belatedly followed the French Air Force lead and adopted multi engine schnell bombers for sturmkampf.

However the USN, RN and IJN had to procure dual role aircraft for attacks against heavily armoured mobile warships, and as assault assets for use against immobile tactical land targets before amphibious landings. Their choice also had to be compatible with operation from aircraft carriers and so full spectrum combat capability navies logically continued to procure single engined dive bombers (sturzkampf) throughout WW2.

From its formation as an Air Force wholly independent from Army control and interference in 1918 the RAF had done its very best to avoid having any obligation to provide CAS for the British Army. The RAF were nevertheless forced against their will to create an Army Co-operation Command with that role. The RAF schlachtkampf / sturmoviki of this era was the 890hp Westland Lysander (Vmax = 199 KTAS) which entered squadron service with the RAF just as the Series II Breda 65 (Vmax = 229 KTAS) began its combat career in Spain, but like the Nomad the Lysander had no pretensions at all to being an assalto.

Yet two nations made the huge mistake which the USSR, UK, France and Italy all avoided. Two major nations cloned the USAAC Northrop A-17 Nomad to fly the assalto mission.


NORTHROP A-17 NOMAD CLONES.

The Junkers Ju 87 was just a clone of the pre existing Northrop A-17 Nomad with a German engine and dive brakes. The Ju 87 had all the advantages and deficiencies of the pre existing Northrop Nomad. On the other hand the Ba 65 had only some of the advantages, but all of the deficiencies, of the Fairy Battle.

The Mitsubishi Ki-30, which began combat operations with the IJAAF in China, just before the Breda 65 Series II began combat operations in Spain, was a more interesting hybrid. Like the earlier Ju 87 it was a stronger and more powerful clone of the Northrop A-17 Nomad, with external bomb carriage, but the Ki-30 also incorporated an internal bomb bay as fitted to the Ba 65 and marked the evolution of such aircraft in the IJAAF from pure CAS assets to joint CAS and deep strike assault capability.

The Mitsubishi Ki-30 flew both types of mission profile against Chinese opposition from 1938 to 1942, Soviet opposition in 1939, and USAAC opposition over the Philippines in 1941. Its 960hp engine allowed a normal bombload of 660lbs and Vmax = 229 KTAS, despite having enormously strong fixed gear for use from hastily prepared fields very close to the FLOT in China and Manchuria.

Like the Ba 65 the Ki-30 did not dive bomb. Of these land based sturmkampf only the Ju 87 ever had an anti shipping role and ever had any significant reason to dive bomb. Whatever the errors and omissions of the Breda 65 design at least it wasn't just another Northrop A-17 Nomad clone.


BREDA 65 (COMBAT) IN SPAIN.

All early deliveries of the Ba 65 had Gnome et Rhone GR14K Mistral Major engines built under licence in Italy by Isotta Fraschini. A faltering attempt was made to introduce Ba65s to existing Ba 64 squadriglia in Italy (see later). However following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War during 1936 the first four production Ba 65s were delivered to Palma (Majorca) in December 1936, followed by the next eight in January 1937, even though they had already failed to become operational in Italy. The expectation was that after brief non combat trails far from the front line action they would soon reach combat readiness in squadron strength. It was not to be. They remained in their crates.

For reasons explained below the Ba 65 took a long time to reach combat readiness. No crews were assigned to fly them until April - May 1937 when they were shipped to Cadiz to join the Italian trials aircrew as they slowly volunteered for combat duty in Spain with the 'Aviazione Legionaria'. For propaganda reasons the new Ba 65 squadron was the '65th Squadriglia Autonoma di Assalto' commanded by Captain Vittorio Desiderio. In June 1937 the 65th moved to Soria for operational training followed by combat operations. There is no longer an airfield near Soria and so in FS9 we must use Burgos (LEBG) to replicate the terrain and weather during that earliest phase of Ba 65 operational training and combat.

The pilots flying for the fascist insurgency were all volunteers and therefore not logically selected and posted from Regia Aeronautica assalto squadrons already experienced in the new role. Many had extreme difficulty converting to the Ba 65. Many had no prior monoplane experience, no experience of flaps, no experience of retractable gear, no experience of controllable pitch airscrews. Other problems unique to the Ba 65 are documented elsewhere in this release, (See How to survive flying the Ba 65.txt). Landing accidents soon began, though most such accidents were repairable, and loss of control incidents mounted. Consequently the squadron did not reach combat readiness until August 1937, nine months after the aircraft had been diverted to Spain, instead of forming the first complete Ba 65 squadron in Italy.


SORIA COMBAT OPERATIONS.

From August to November 1937 the 65th flew combat sorties from Soria (use LEBG in FS9). The earliest sorties were flown against government strong points around Santander, its port, and the Main Supply Routes (MSRs) emanating from Santander to the FLOT. Many histories of the Ba 65 assert that the 65th soon moved to Vitoria at the time they switched the focus of their bombing operations to Bilbao, its port, and the MSRs emanating from Bilbao, but the reality seems to be that they remained at Soria until almost the end of November 1937 attacking both Santander and Bilbao from there (use LEBG in FS9).


BRIEF AUTONOMY.

The issue of the time normal bombs took to arm after release was critical during autonomous operations from Soria. The operational training had disclosed that the only way a Ba 65 could hit hard targets with 'large' bombs was to make lay down attacks at low level.

This required the armourers to 'pre wind' the little propellers on the tails of the bombs until they were almost armed prior to release. This allowed the bombs to arm about one second after release and allowed the 65th to fly accurate 'lay down' attacks with 'large' bombs against hard targets despite having no aiming devices, since they could then use the same method to deliver large bombs against hard targets as they had trained to deliver fragmentation grenades against soft targets.

There is however a good reason why this is a really bad idea. Lay down attacks are only compatible with the blast radius of small bombs whose mass does not exceed 10Kg (as carried by biplane jagdbombers). During missions when hard targets were lay down attacked with 50Kg and 100Kg bombs the attacking Ba 65s were frequently stuck by bomb fragments from their own bombs, catching them up at much higher (post explosion) velocity.

This was made worse by failure to employ a high angle dive attack. The Ba 65s were crossing the target at speeds that were far too slow to avoid bomb blast damage and which made them very vulnerable to point blank small arms fire and light Flak. In addition allowing swift arming of large bombs, hung vertically by the nose, does not solve the problem of ricochet. The little propeller may release the firing pin very quickly, but if the bomb strikes at a shallow angle the firing pin is not driven forward to detonate the bomb. Grenades have (short delay) time fuses. At this date 'large' Italian bombs all had percussion fuses.

The Ba 65 pilots were soon complaining that they were overworked, excessively vulnerable, both over the target, and during egress from the target, and they could not maintain sufficient situational awareness of enemy threat envelopes. In the mountains of northern Spain they were also struggling to achieve pilotage by pioneer (VFR) means as winter approached. Two aircraft were field modified to have a makeshift open cockpit behind the real enclosed cockpit. An attempt was made to add wireless equipment for that rear crew member to aid navigation. It failed. There was not enough room. Both field installations badly compromised useful load and both upset the Centre of Gravity (CG) causing the Ba 65 to be even more likely to suffer loss of control.


MIXED STRIKE PACKAGES - TUDELA COMBAT OPERATIONS.

Captain Desiderio was relieved and replaced by Captain Duilio Fanali before the 65th moved to Tudela in late November to help 'shape the battlefield' for the gruelling winter campaign against the province of Navarre in appalling weather. Again no airfield survives close to Tudela so in FS9 we must use Monflorite (LEHC) to replicate terrain, weather and navigation challenges.

This marked a swift and necessary change in operating strategy. Squadron morale was low. The pilots were brave and determined, but the Ba 65 was not capable of attacking hard targets with adequate precision unless the pilots were squandered at low level, dropping bombs that were too big to be safe from a lay down attack doctrine. Consequently the 65th Squadriglia was quickly no longer 'autonoma', but was now attached to a *smaller* Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna Gruppo (35th Gruppo Autonomo Bombardamento Veloce), with just six Cicognas, which had been assigned the twin engined schnell bomber (SB = BV) role.

In bad winter weather the Bredas simply could not find their way to their targets in the Pyrenees, or back to base through the mountains after striking their targets, if they ever located them. From now on in Spain Breda 65s flew in formation with superior, (and faster), twin engine schnell bombers, which had to slow down so that the single engine Bredas could keep up. The Cicognas departed first followed by the Bredas. They all climbed to 4500M, sometimes 5000M, and joined up at that altitude *well inside fascist airspace* and beyond the range at which they could be seen by enemy observers. They joined formation and crossed the FLOT tracking quickly towards the target already at 4500M or above, however short the combat radius of the mission. Chato CAP was rarely higher, and never above cloud, whilst Rata interceptors, alerted too late failed to reach 4500M in time to attack before the fast cruising mixed strike package was over the target.

The Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna crews led the formation out and back performing any necessary wireless navigation. Five new Ba 65s arrived in January 1938. Four had already been lost to accidents and inappropriate attack doctrine, and so this increased 65th squadron strength to thirteen aircraft. During the shaping of the Navarre battlefield from Tudela typical formations were four Cicognas leading four to six Bredas. The Cicogna crews flew much more often. Of course the Breda crews just opened their bomb bays and released their bombs when the Cicogna formation leader did so. Unlike the Fiats the Bredas had no radio or wireless of any kind with which to communicate.

Now engaged almost entirely in medium level bombing, government airfields were added to the monthly target list. Obviously such mixed strike package sorties are difficult to simulate in MSFS so we should use winter operations from LEHC to understand the difficulty of navigating VFR to attack targets in the high Pyrenees near the French border, as far west as San Sebastian, and then finding LEHC again without access to wireless navigation, *in mid winter*. These sorties also carry the risk that we will attack a main supply route through the Pyrenees on the wrong side of the border, bringing France into the war. When simulating, (non existent and autonomous), winter operations from LEHC we should attempt to penetrate the Pyrenean passes almost as far as the French border, below all cloud, in real winter weather, without using any form of electronic navigation and then finding our way back to LEHC without invoking electronic cheat modes.

After the fascist insurgent advance northwards and westwards had concluded, the 65th still working within the 35th Gruppo Autonomo Bombardamento Veloce, began to shape the new battlefield for the spring offensive. This would be the great advance to the Mediterranean coast of Aragon and the new source of government supply was the port of Barcelona.

The primary targets were, as for any Assalto squadron, prepared defensive positions far beyond the FLOT, while the secondary targets were the enemy main supply routes (bridges, rail and road junctions) from the source of supply to the FLOT. Government airfields were attacked, but only via medium level formation bombing. Blitzkrieg was being trialled and developed on the hoof. Once the Air Force commanders declared that the battlefield had been shaped to their satisfaction the Army was allowed to order the next sweeping advance. Once fascist land forces were successful in combat assalto squadrons were used to harass retreating enemy forces on the MSRs, or deny supply to those who continued to fight. They did *not* attack at the FLOT.


INFERIORITY OF CAS DURING ADVANCE (apparently) CLARIFIED.

Air assault units should never provide CAS to the allied army. As the Spanish Civil War first created and then evolved modern warfare and the whole concept of blitzkrieg, (Air-Land War), the reality that CAS was an inferior use of air power was apparently clarified. The German Army would soon be denied CAS on principle, for all bar Paratroop forces, and the German Army would soon be wholly subservient to the Luftwaffe, unable to move a single tank without Luftwaffe permission, (with disastrous results at Dunkerque).

Aircraft that might have been wasted on CAS in other nations were used only for blitzkrieg, spearheading the assault, by 'shaping the battlefield' far beyond the FLOT until Axis Air Force commanders allowed the Army to advance their tanks supported by infantry into the ground the Air Force had shaped for them and deemed ready for them to mop up and move on, leaving infantry to deal with the many prisoners who wished to surrender. After the perfection of blitzkrieg (Air-Land War) in Spain in the late 1930s fascist victory soon followed fascist victory in annual summer succession, and for several years to come. The concept and ability quickly spread to Japan.

As the fascist advance through Aragon to the Mediterranean continued another battlefield suddenly needed to be shaped. The battle for control of the Ebro (river valley) west of Reus began with a government assault achieving a bridgehead west of the River Ebro. The fascists soon swept away all the existing bridges over the Ebro by opening a dam, but the original bridges were soon replaced by two pontoon bridges with government supply flooding across into the bridgehead.


PUIG MORENO - COMBAT OPERATIONS

The 35th Gruppo Autonomo Bombardamento Veloce relocated en masse from Tudela to Puig Moreno on 4th June 1938. Captain Miotto now replaced Captain Fanali. In FS9 we must substitute Calamocha (LECH) for the once nearby air base at Puig Moreno. The Gruppo now acquired a second Cicogna squadriglia bringing Fiat strength also to thirteen.

Even though the mixed strike packages often / usually descended to 3000M just before the target to aim their bombs, before immediately climbing back to 4500M for egress, the crews of the 65th had increasingly concluded that bombing from medium level with a tiny bombload was unproductive, and that flying directly over the target in level flight during a lay down attack with the wrong kind of bombs at ultra low level was almost suicidal.


MUCH NEEDED FIELD MODIFICATIONS.

It had become increasingly clear to the 65th that the absence of external bomb racks, preventing high angle precision bombing of hard tactical targets, was crazy in an aeroplane assigned the Assalto role. Captain Miotto decided that external bomb racks and release mechanisms must be invented, produced, and trialled in the field, and that Ba 65 specific high angle precision bombing tactics must be evolved so that the Ba 65 could emulate the capability of the Fairey Battle. Drilling holes through the structure and running new control cables to wing pylons, to add missing equipment after issue to a squadron is not a trivial matter, but the design deficiency was so great that it had to be done. No attempt was ever made to add plumbing for external fuel tanks.

Some histories of the Spanish Civil War claim that Breda 65s flew dive bombing (sturzkampf) missions in Spain, but that is just the result of failing to understand the meaning of 'dive bombing'. After external bomb racks were added via a field lash up, just before the Ebro campaign in July 1938, the 65th could add high angle (minus 30 degree glideslope) precision bombing doctrine to their tactics. That greatly increased their combat effectiveness in the Assalto role, but they still could not dive bomb. The Ba 65 had no dive brakes, inadequate pitch authority to sustain high IAS dives, and inadequate structural strength to withstand them. See 'How to survive flying the Ba 65.htm'. Journalists who wrote about the successful attacks on the pontoon bridges over the Ebro were unable to understand the difference and their mistake has been widely plagiarised ever since.


SUPERIORITY OF STURMKAMPF DURING RETREATS.

The two pontoon bridges across the River Ebro near Flix became the only supply route for government forces. Time and time again the Fiat B.R.20s, any Bredas flying in formation with them, along with assorted German bombers, failed to hit them by medium level day bombing. Mounting one 100 Kg bomb under each wing, on the newly cobbled together under-wing racks, the 65th conducted fifty-nine high angle attack sorties against the two key pontoon bridges. They claimed six direct hits while the Spanish government admitted only three, but the vital bridges were destroyed. With government forces thus denied re-supply the Battle of the Ebro would soon be another blitzkrieg success for the fascists.

During the Ebro campaign in the high summer of 1938 autonomous pilotage and operation was possible. Departing LECH the Ebro river bridges lie directly east. We simply track right of the bridges and follow the Ebro north to the pontoon bridges just east of where the Ebro suddenly widens. The only challenge is finding our way back to LECH which is 82 miles west of the Ebro. How to learn pioneer era pilotage in primitive aircraft is described within 'How to survive flying the Ba 65.htm' and in the 2008 Propliner Tutorial from www.calclassic.com/tutorials.


BREDA Ba 65 SERIES II arrives in Spain.

The Mistral Major powered Ba 65 Series I, although invulnerable to Polikarpov I-15/bis Chato fighters remained vulnerable to the ever more numerous Spanish government's much faster Polikarpov I-16 Rata interceptors. By August 1938 the 65th was again down to eight aircraft now operating alongside never fewer than twelve Fiat B.R.20s. In August and September 1938 six swifter Fiat A.80 engined series II Ba 65s, (as contained in this flight sim release), were assembled from their delivery crates at Logrono (LELO). After a few days of trials at Logrono each moved to Puig Moreno, (use LECH in FS9), for type conversion training, which together with the modifications needed to fit the missing external bomb racks, took about a week. Some historians have asserted that the 65th flew combat missions from Logrono, but that appears to be false.

65th Squadriglia strength rose briefly to fourteen aircraft and September 1938 was the combat debut for the Fiat engined series II which we will be flying in FS9. The 65th now had separate Gnome Rhone (GR14) and Fiat (A80) engined flights. Thereafter they did not fly together. One or other Breda flight tagged along behind one or other Cicogna squadriglia on alternate missions.

In January 1939 Captain Miotto relinquished command to Captain Grossi. The assault on Barcelona continued, but a new battlefield had to shaped for the final sweeping fascist blitzkrieg through the final province of Catalonia towards Girona. The primary targets became the two MSRs from Girona up to Perpignan, (south of the French border!), which are easy enough to find VFR. However throughout this period, some sorties were still being flown against government defensive strong points around Barcelona. Once again if autonomous operations are attempted in the winter of 1938-39 the problem is finding our way back to LECH without cheating by invoking electronic assistance. In practice the Bredas continued to operate only at medium - high level in formation with the Cicognas.


SWEEPING VICTORY FOR FASCISM via blitzkrieg.

Some historians assert that later the same winter the 65th, still within the Cicogna Gruppo, moved all the way back to Olmedo (LE0A). However this is not confirmed by the aircraft records which show individual aircraft movements. The truth seems to be that only one Cicogna squadriglia moved to Olmedo whilst all of the Bredas and the other Cicogna squadriglia remained at Puig Moreno until hostilities were over. Historians agree that the 65th's final combat sortie was flown on 24th March 1939, but disagree whether it was from Puig Moreno or Olmedo.

The 65th had then undertaken over 18 months of continuous combat operations during which they had flown 1,921 Ba 65 combat sorties. Only 368 of those sorties had involved descent to low level to strafe or 'lay down' attack targets and only 59 more had been high angle precision bombing attacks terminating at low level. The rest had been area bombing attacks from medium level, hence the exceptionally low loss rate in combat in Spain.


COMBAT LOSSES.

The 65th disbanded soon after, the aircrew returning to Italy. Of the twenty-three Ba 65s that flew those combat missions Italian records claim only three were shot down by Spanish government action, whilst Spanish government records claim six air to air kills against Bredas plus at least one admitted AAA kill. However the Italian records show three more Ba 65s lost in 'forced landings' which probably represent Ba 65s lost due to battle (air to air) damage, but in which the pilot survived. One more was destroyed 'in flight' which may imply structural failure, and two more were written off in major landing accidents. This suggests that two more were cannibalised for spares after 'lesser' landing accidents, since both sides agree twelve were 'consumed' during the fighting and that only eleven survived to pass to the unified Spanish Air Force in May 1939. All six of the Series II aircraft with slatted wings from the Fiat A.80 flight which had flown combat missions from September 1938 to March 1939 survived the civil war.

The new unified Spanish Air Force treated the eleven surviving Breda 65s as operational for only one further year, basing both flights in Madrid. They were then both assigned to the Academia de Aviacion at Leon (LELN) as assalto role trainers where they served in that role until 1945. Training sorties from LELN to anywhere in Spain we please (and back) using only tourist maps of Spain, (or Plan G - see later), and no electronic cheat modes, should provide many hours of useful pioneer navigation era training, but remember the Ba 65 is designed to cruise VFR at 4500 metres, or the base of cloud only if lower. Obviously winter navigation with lower cloud will prove more challenging. The survivors at Leon in 1945 were the last Ba 65s in service anywhere by about a year.


GERMAN STURZKAMPF IN SPAIN

We can now usefully contrast the combat record of the Ba 65 assalto = sturmkampf with that of German sturzkampf in Spain. The Luftwaffe supplied tiny numbers of various sturmkampf, all with sturzkampf (stuka) capability, to their Kondor Legion in Spain, but only for secret research and development trials. In the air assault role they served only with German research and development units in Spain.

The Luftwaffe began to ship single seat, VFR only, fixed gear biplane Henschel Hs123 A-1 Stukas (Vmax = 184 KTAS) to Spain in September 1936. After an extended four month period of non combat trails, just three Hs 123A-1 began Stuka combat trials with the Kondor Legion in January 1937. This was about two months after the first homogeneous Luftwaffe Stuka squadron became fully equipped with the Hs 123A-1 in Germany. The Hs 123 Stuka combat trials, from Seville against strong points and supply choke points around Malaga, were deemed a total failure and all outstanding Luftwaffe Hs 123 orders were immediately cancelled.

The three trials Hs 123A-1s in Spain were then joined by just three more from Germany and re-organised into an operational schlachtkampf (CAS) flight operating from Vitoria in close air support of fascist infantry advancing on Bilbao. Chronically slow and with very poor situational awareness three were shot down in March, May and June 1937. By then another had crashed. The other two Hs 123A-1s were then retired to the quiet southern front where they were theoretically operational, but seem to have seen no further combat.

Although twelve improved ex Luftwaffe Hs 123B-1 Stukas were supplied second hand to the Spanish Nationalist Air Force in October 1938 they declined to use them in combat, also deploying them only where they would see no combat, despite being assigned to a theoretically combat active squadron. However in March 1940 in contrast to the eleven surviving Ba 65s all fourteen surviving Spanish Hs 123s were assigned to Escuadrilla 61 at Tablada and deployed as an 'operational' schlachtkampf squadron. But of course the civil war was over and they never had to fly a combat mission. To the Spanish the Hs 123 was the 'Angelito' (little angel). They were still in 'active' service in 1946, but probably retired that year. The Spanish Air Force never acquired a better dive bomber than the failed Hs 123 and clung to that failed concept until 1946.

A single pre production Ju 87A-0 sturzkampf was sent to Spain in November 1936 and it joined the Hs 123A-1 air assault trials flown from Seville against Malaga. Its two crew capabilities made it an easy winner in those comparative assault trials even though it had no wireless. Unlike the three Henschels that lone Ju 87A-0 continued to fly assault sorties after moving to Vitoria and alongside the much more numerous Bredas operating from Soria it played a very minor role in shaping the battlefield for the attack on Bilbao. Having thus completed its secret trials the single Ju 87A returned to Germany in July 1937. To the Spanish the Ju 87A was the 'Junkers Estupido'.

Just three production standard Ju 87A-1s were deployed to Vitoria for combat trails in January 1938 marking the Ju 87A-1s combat debut. They flew further infrequent secret equipment and tactics trials in each of the campaigns mentioned above and having completed their trials all three returned to Germany in October 1938. The Luftwaffe also took the opportunity to rotate their Ju 87 aircrew through this tiny trials unit giving them slight combat experience. Only ever assigned to a trials unit the three Ju 87A-1s achieved little when infrequently attacking land targets, but were more successful than other Kondor Legion aircraft when tasked for anti shipping strike, especially if the ship was tied up to the dockside, or anchored in the port of Barcelona. Sturzkampf had genuine additional combat utility against ships, until superior tactics were evolved by the Regia Aeronautica during 1941.

These three Ju 87A-1s were eventually replaced in the Kondor Legion R&D unit by just five production standard Ju 87B-1s, but they flew no combat trials until the Catalonia campaign in January 1939. That marked the combat debut of the classic early WW2 variety of Ju 87. One was shot down whilst on an R&D trial within a few weeks of their combat debut and the other four then hastily returned to Germany.

Any idea that German single engined aircraft played a significant role in air assault operations in Spain is false. For assalto operations by single engined aircraft the fascist insurgency was reliant on the 65th Squadriglia flying almost two thousand sorties in the Ba 65, and their role in the 'Battle of the Ebro' was crucial.


ITALIAN PRECURSORS and TWO SEATERS.

The Breda Ba 64 and Ba 65 were both designed by Antonio Parano and Giuseppe Panzeri. The Ba 64 had poor handling, heavy controls and unsafe stall / spin characteristics. 'Heavy' is the way spin doctors like to explain 'inadequate high speed control authority'. Introduced to the Regia Aeronautica squadrons during 1936, but after the Northrop A-17 deployed with the USAAC, the Ba 64 was withdrawn during 1939 and never flew a combat mission. What might logically have been the Ba 64bis became the Ba 65, because no one wanted to associate the latest Breda with the one before. The Ba 64 had four 7.7mm Breda machine guns, but in the Ba 65 the inner pair were 12.7mm machine guns, each with three to four times the effective firepower of a rifle calibre machine gun.

The desire to have an observer in the Ba 64 and Ba 65 was frequently expressed by Breda pilots who believed it would increase their survival chances. Given the modest loss rate in combat over Spain it should have been resisted, but it was not and Breda were required to design and deliver a number of two seaters for comparative trials in Italy well away from combat in Spain. Some two seaters were fitted with dual controls so that instructors supplied by Breda could conduct both ab initio and remedial teaching using those aircraft after allocation to the operational Stormi in Italy. As we shall see that worked well when training foreign aircrew, but not when training Italian aircrew.

The resulting CG problems arising from creation of the two seaters were always so bad that it was immediately clear that the observer could not have a wireless set with which to navigate and would never be more than an air gunner who could suppress enemy fire during target egress. For a combat aircraft with truly tiny bombload the extra weight of the observer, any Breda M-1 turret, and a rear gun was ridiculous unless the mission was purely a strafing mission. The majority of Bredas delivered to the RA continued to be single seaters as originally intended, but Breda continued to misrepresent the two seater version as a success abroad.

The Ba 64 had been powered by the single row 9 cylinder Bristol Pegasus engine, (built under licence by Alfa Romeo as the A.R.125 RC35). The Ba 65 Series I had the more powerful 14 cylinder Gnome et Rhone GR14K Mistral Major. The main advantage of adopting fourteen tiny cylinders was that it was easier to see over the nose. Isotta Fraschini duly obtained a licence to manufacture the GR14K in Italy. However in due course the Series I with the Mistral Major engine would be viewed as underpowered and too slow to evade the I-16 Rata and so the Series II would acquire the even more powerful 18 cylinders two row Fiat A.80RC41 engine as used in the Fiat G.18 Veloce airliner and the Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna schnell bomber, and as supplied in this flight sim release.


COMPARISONS OF COMBAT UTILITY.

When we fly the September 1938 (combat debut) vintage Ba 65 Series II in FS9 we must be careful not to attempt sorties it could not fly. It is time to study the combat utility and mission profile of the single seat Ba 65 Series II in detail.

Vmax = 229 KTAS

Typical equipped empty weight = 6306lbs
Maximum take off weight = 7960lbs
Crew = 200lbs (with flying clothing and parachute)
Useful load = 7960 - 6506 = 1454lbs
Maximum fuel = 1014lbs
Normal bombload = 440lbs (200 Kg)
Maximum bombload = 880lbs (provided fuel reduced to only 574 lbs)

Every combat mission requires a fixed and combined fuel reserve for taxi, take off, climb, combat, holding, circuit to land, and diversion. Not so much diversion to an alternate place of landing but 'diversion' around threats. A combat sortie is rarely a single straight line out and back. The reserve required relates to engine power and whilst TOGA power is neither war emergency power, nor design cruise power, for our purposes we can treat the necessary (nil wind) VFR fuel reserve as 30 minutes at TOGA power. The Fiat A.80RC41 was TOGA rated at 1000hp.

1000hp x SFC 0.5 x 0.5 hours = 250lbs.

During a Ba 65 sortie we expect to expend most of that reserve during taxi, take off, climb, dog legging around threats, and combat. We expect to land with much less than 250lbs remaining, but we cannot use the first 250lbs of fuel we put into the tanks of a 1000hp aeroplane as combat radius fuel.

The on screen handling notes explain the design cruise conditions.

***********************************
Tactical cruise power - all levels:

C = 0.7
RPM = 1800

Yields 192 KTAS (FL150/4500M plan 280 PPH)
Yields 172 KTAS (low level plan 260 PPH)
***************************

We have no significant idea what headwinds we will meet, (especially over enemy territory), and a tailwind in one direction does *not* cancel out a headwind on the other leg. Everything in aviation is 4D and relates to TIME.

.....See 2008 Propliner Tutorial from Calclassic.com/tutorials

We must factor in a 15% weather reserve which is a factor of the trip length.

If we load only the normal bombload of 440lbs we have 1014 - 250 lbs of route fuel = 764lbs, but 15% of that is weather reserve.

Our combat radius fuel (allowing for weather) is (764 * 0.85 / 2) = 325lbs

Our planned combat radius must not exceed 325lbs / 280 PPH = 1.16 hours at 192 KTAS = 223 miles

That is compatible with a solo 160 mile penetration of enemy airspace provided our base is no more than 63 miles behind the FLOT.


MEDIUM LEVEL versus LOW LEVEL.

To avoid interception by scrambled interceptors, and perhaps patrolling fighters, we will always penetrate at a minimum of 4500M altitude at a minimum of 192 KTAS, never at low level at 172 KTAS. Flying the sortie at low level makes little difference to our combat radius;

172 * 325 / 260 = 215 miles

but penetrating in thin high air instead of thick low air makes a significant (12%) difference to the time we must spend over enemy territory. In aviation everything is 4D and relates to TIME. In the absence of enemy radar we penetrate at design cruise level and we egress at design cruise level, whatever level we attack the target from, to make life harder for any scrambled interceptors trying to achieve interception. We 'divert' around enemy interceptor bases and any visible air superiority fighter CAP at higher level. In a properly designed assalto we can ignore fighter CAP at lower level with impunity.

Above all else, in a non radar environment, bombers should always climb above cloud if at all possible whilst over enemy territory to prevent detection and continuous tracking. Enemy CAP will normally be below cloud. Navigation should be by wireless means, according to the GPS plot being updated by the WO.

...See 2008 Propliner Tutorial from www.calclassic.com/tutorials

the strike package descends below cloud cover only when in the vicinity of the target, to acquire a fire control solution versus the target, before climbing above any available cloud cover to egress on a different vector without being tracked.

Of course the single seat Ba 65 lacked that crucial advantage and consequently struggled to operate autonomously. The 65th Squadriglia soon had to be aggregated within a smaller Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna Gruppo so that their Wireless Operators could lead a mixed strike package above cloud postponing enemy detection.

The Polikarpov I-16 Rata was a real threat if scrambled early enough, but that depended on early detection of the raid. Like the Series II Ba 65 the Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna (Vmax 232 KTAS) schnell bombers were powered by exactly the same high altitude optimised Fiat A.80RC41 engine as used in the Fiat G.18 Veloce airliner. When the Cicogna pilots applied just less than 0.7C @ 1800 RPM at 4500M from two engines burning 560 PPH the big Fiats slowed to 192 KTAS in high thin air and the single engined Bredas could just keep up, (provided they had no external bombs).


BREDA DEFICIENCIES.

Autonomy had not worked for the Bredas. Without winter weather and low visibility they were too visible and too vulnerable. With that winter weather in the Spanish mountains they were unable to operate autonomously because they could not navigate more than a very short distance, but once they joined mixed strike packages with superior IFR aircraft they achieved the necessary navigation and stealthy penetration profile above cloud to achieve very low combat loss rates.

The Bredas had no bomb aiming equipment for their internal bombs at all, but they could open the bay doors when they saw the Fiats do so, and they could release their two or four 100 Kg bombs just after the B.R.20 formation leader released his 4 x 250Kg bombs. Even after the external bomb racks were added Ba 65s hardly ever flew high angle attacks terminating at low level, making just 59 such attacks in 1,921 combat sorties over Spain.

At the time journalists surmised wrongly that the Ba 65s had been assigned as close escort fighters for the Fiats, but that uneducated thought did not survive analysis. Nobody orders schnell bombers to slow down so that the escort fighters can keep up. If the Bredas had carried external bombs on such missions they would have been even slower.

We can simulate the drag effect of carrying external bombs in the Ba 65 of course. The drag of the external bombs (and whether they are visible) is controlled with the 'spoiler' (/) key. We should determine the % velocity penalty of carrying 2 x 100Kg bombs externally using FS9 to measure it. The % loss of velocity (TAS) is the same as the % decrease in IAS. The absolute velocity loss is higher at high altitude in thin air.

The Ba 65 desperately needed to avoid combat with a Polikarpov I-16 Rata, but whenever the mixed Italian formations were intercepted by Ratas the I-16 pilots were naturally under orders to concentrate their firepower on the more capable Fiats B.R.20 Cicognas which dropped up to five times the bombload, at the same combat radius from the same carefully maintained peacetime airfield.


WARLOAD versus COMBAT RADIUS.

The 'Boys Big Book of Wonderplanes' will inform us that the Ba 65 could carry 880lbs (or more) of bombs. Well it could, but it's not really the point. To lift 880lbs of bombs, instead of 440lbs, we must first drain 440lbs of precious fuel.

Our route fuel is now only 324lbs and our radius fuel falls to just 138lbs.

172 * 138 / 260 = 91 miles.

So it is true that a Ba 65 could lift an 880lb bombload, and in Spain some targets were sometimes less than 91 miles from base, but the main supply routes to any objective always lie beyond the next blitzkrieg objective. The Ba 65 could operate autonomously and with an 880lb bombload only over extremely short ranges against fixed location targets that were easy to find and identify while flying VFR at 4500M in nice summer weather.

Mecozzi's proposal that assalto assets must be able to bomb bridges and other supply choke points up to 300 Km (160 miles) beyond the FLOT was not a random choice. The 'normal bombload' of an Assalto asset is the bomb load it can drop on a target 160 miles beyond the FLOT and significantly more than 160 miles from its base (nominally 200 miles for cross comparison and real procurement purposes). The normal bombload of the Ba 65 was 200 Kg = 440lbs because it needed all of its carefully planned internal fuel capacity to fly its design mission profile. Not surprisingly that is the bombload present by default in this FS9 release and the default fuel is maximum fuel. The Ba 65 pilot could *not* afford to squander that fuel applying more than 0.7C boost more than briefly, especially if he hoped to lift more than 200Kg of bombs on an ultra short radius strike.

Piston engined aircraft cannot cruise at Vmax. For this slice of aviation history the data for the Series II Ba 65 are fairly typical. Vmax = 229 KTAS and tactical cruise = 192 KTAS (84% Vmax) at medium level or only 172 KTAS (75% Vmax) at low level. Even the Series II Ba 65 was slower than the B.R.20 which had exactly twice the power, and the Fairey Battle was slower than the Blenheim even though the Blenheim had much less than twice the power. There was a perfectly good reason that multi engined schnell bombers replaced single engined sturmkampf on land bases. Italy had already grasped that reality and had already deployed the 2 x 1000hp Fiat B.R.20 in the Schnell Bomber = assault role with 1 x 1000hp Bredas just tagging along following their lead by mid 1938.


COMBAT UTILITY of TWO SEAT v SINGLE SEAT BREDAS.

Breda were ordered to produce some Ba65s for the Regia Aeronautica with a rear gunner in a second cockpit which seems to have been too far aft to be safe. RA two seaters did not have heavy rear turrets, just a rear cockpit. The rear gunner was present only to augment situational awareness and to deliver suppressing fire. He had no wireless. We shall examine their fate later.

The total weight penalty was considerable but was officially and very optimistically assessed as only 105Kg = 231 lbs. The relevant operating manuals called for a two seater, when loaded with the same bombload, to load that much less fuel, (all drained from the rear tank). The normal warload (excluding ammo) of the single seater was 440lbs of bombs plus 1,014lbs of fuel whilst the normal warload of the two seater was 440lbs of bombs plus only 783lbs of fuel, each then being at the (identical) maximum take off weight permitted. Consequently even the RA two seaters were unable to fly the assalto mission.

In all probability the new far aft load of seat, gunner, gun and ammo was actually greater than the official allowance causing CG related handling problems in an aeroplane which already had more than enough control authority problems.

Export two seaters, with an extremely heavy Breda turret to provide a rigid gun mount, were heavier when empty and had even less combat radius. In practice the turreted two seaters never attempted to attack a target more than 50 miles from their base and I can only assume they always departed with an empty rear fuel tank and a very limited load of fragmentation grenades. No two seaters of any kind were ever fitted with external bomb racks.

Since single seaters and two seaters always operated at the same weight we can use a single set of flight dynamics to replicate both varieties of Ba 65. When simulating two seat operations we use the payload and fuel menu to add 230lbs (105Kg) to the crew load and then subtract 230lbs from the REAR (right) fuel tank to handicap our combat radius.


NORTHROP A-17 NOMAD ... ROLE and UTILITY compared.

By early 1936 spin offs from the 'New Deal' which had put an end to government and corporate corruption in the United States had allowed the USA to established a rapid and clear lead in both commercial aircraft and CAS aircraft. The US Army were still wedded to Land-Air War and had achieved world superiority in that specialised and apparently outdated role. Once it entered squadron service around February 1936 the Northrop A-17 Nomad became the new worldwide schlachtkampf /sturmoviki benchmark and would be eagerly cloned by some nations.

Vmax = 179 KTAS

Typical equipped empty weight = 4937lbs
Maximum take off weight = 7337lbs
Crew = 400lbs (with flying clothing and parachute)
Useful load = 7337 - 5337 = 2000lbs (approx)
Normal bombload = 440lbs (200 Kg)
Max fuel = 1560lbs (approx)
Normal bombload = 440lbs (200 Kg)
Max bombload = 880lbs provided fuel reduced to 'only' 1120 lbs

At this date the USAAC was still mostly using French pattern bombs from WW1, most of which were metric. They were 'designated' 100lb bombs, but they were really 50Kg bombs. I won't take you through all the comparisons. The most obvious thing is how overweight the single seat Ba 65 was when empty. The single seat Ba 65 weighed in at well over 6000lbs whilst Northrop were able to keep the two seat A-17 below 5000lbs. Of course the Breda needed a much bigger and more powerful engine to be immune from biplane fighters. The performance of the fixed gear A-17 looks poor when flown at almost the same weight as the Ba 65, but it has wireless navigation, firepower to suppress ground fire during egress, an observer to detect and evaluate threats, and much more fuel when carrying the same bombload.


AVIATION IS a 4D ACTIVITY.

That extra fuel does not translate into the same % extra range because the 1938 vintage Ba 65 Series II is 28% faster and covers 28% more ground per hour (nil wind and therefore bigger advantage in average weather with a net headwind out and back).

750hp x 0.5 x 0.5 = 188lbs.

Let's assume A-17 tactical cruise at 84% of Vmax and therefore at 179 * 0.84 = 150 KTAS.

Fuel burn will also be in proportion. Tactical cruise in the Ba 65 required 280PPH/1000hp = 28% of TOGA as PPH.

750hp * 0.28 = 210PPH.

In an A-17 our route fuel is 1560 - 188 = 1372lbs. Our combat radius fuel is (1372 *0.85 /2) = 583lbs

Our planned combat radius must not exceed 583lbs / 210 PPH = 2.78 hours at 150 KTAS = 417 miles

With the same bombload a two seat A-17 of early 1936 had almost twice the combat radius of the single seat Ba 65 of late 1938. Even in early 1936 the A-17 carried its bombs externally and could high angle precision bomb. The only thing the Series II Breda 65 of late 1938 had going for it was its (genuinely huge) 28% speed advantage.

The need for that Ba 65 speed advantage, at the expense of bombload else combat radius, is due to the Ba 65 having the deep penetration assault role whilst the A-17 was only a FLOT CAS role and never needed to venture further over the FLOT than the enemy gun line. The A-17 needed a very long patrol endurance just behind the FLOT waiting on CAP to advance to combat when a wireless request for CAS was received. The A-17 had that very long patrol endurance near the FLOT, and the necessary wireless plus operator. The Ba 65 made a very inferior CAS asset, but unlike the A-17 it was 'just' schnell enough to be a successful assalto, albeit with tiny bombload, and only in lovely weather.

So, long before the first Italian squadron became fully equipped with the Ba 65 in May 1937, the USAAC were already operating 110 monoplane, day only, but IFR capable, two crew A-17 Nomads, across the continental US and in Panama. Among the Ba 65s contemporaries only the Hs 123 was also single crew and also had no wireless operator to navigate the aircraft using DF bearings to update the GPS plot. The Nomad and its later German clone the Ju 87 both lacked an internal bomb bay, partly because the relevant space was occupied by the wireless equipment and its operator. The Henschel 123 was a WW1 anachronism. After instant failure in the assault role in January 1937 the Hs 123 was relegated to CAS despite being wildly inferior to the earlier A-17 Nomad in that role. The Ju 87 was a logical (eventually improved) German clone of the A-17 Nomad with all of its limitations, but with all of its benefits. However cloning an American schlachtkampf to fly the sturmkampf mission was a German (and Japanese) error.


FAIREY BATTLE ... ROLE and UTILITY compared.

The Fairey Battle had four bomb bays within its inner wings each with an extending bomb carrier to permit high angle aiming and delivery of a 250lb bomb. The bomb load of the Blenheim was identical, but its internal bomb bay was conventional and it could not high angle bomb using its internal bombs. For both the RAF and the Belgian Air Force the air assault mission of tactical bridge busting by high angle bombing was specifically a Fairey Battle mission. By contrast the faster Blenheim was soon successfully adapted for both the interceptor role and the night fighter role.

Since full squadron deployment of the Fairey Battle preceded full squadron deployment of even the Series I Breda 65 (or any Ju 87) it is useful to consider how it compared to the much later Ba 65 series II. If realistic Fairey Battle flight dynamics ever exist for MSFS they will cite,

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
[fuel]

290 IG high lead British 87 Octane has a design calorific mass of one long ton (2240lbs) when all four tanks are filled to overflow at 15C.

LeftMain =0,0,0, 137,0
RightMain =0,0,0, 137,0 //1644lbs is standard fuel load outside RAF Coastal Command

//Center1 =0,0,0, 57,0 // Centre tank always present but used only for coastal patrol & convoy escort
//Center2 =0,0,0, 42,0 // Reserve tank always present but used only for coastal patrol & convoy escort

fuel_type=1
number_of_tank_selectors=1


[WEIGHT_AND_BALANCE]

empty_weight = 7656 //including dinghy, coolant, oil, flares, guns, ammo, etc (only 6647 dry ex factory)
max_gross_weight= 10900

RAF acceptance test was 10,792lbs at take off, but 10,900lbs was max authorised and just less than 10,900lbs was normal ramp weight for all users. Coastal patrol aircraft carried only 2 x 250lb bombs (or none) to allow loading of both auxiliary and reserve fuel.

reference_datum_position = 0, 0, 0
empty_weight_CG_position = 0, 0, 0

station_load.0 = 600, 0, 0, 0 ;3 crew in flying clothing with parachutes
station_load.1 = 1000, 0, 0, 0 ;4 x 250lb GP bombs internally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

So by comparison to earlier examples;

Vmax = 209 KTAS

Typical equipped empty weight = 7656lbs
Maximum take off weight = 10900lbs
Crew = 600lbs (with flying clothing and parachute)
Useful load = 10900 - 8256 = 2644lbs
Normal bombload = 1000lbs
Normal fuel = 1644lbs

Max fuel was not normal fuel in the Battle. Max fuel was only carried for maritime patrol and convoy escort missions, not daylight assault or night stealth bombing sorties.

1030hp x 0.5 x 0.5 = 258lbs.

Battle tactical cruise was indeed at 84% of Vmax and therefore at 209 * 0.84 = 176 KTAS. Realistic handling notes would disclose.

***********************************
Normal cruise power - all levels:

BOOST = ZERO
RPM = 2300

Plan 280 PPH
Yields 176 KTAS at FL170
***************************

Our Battle route fuel is 1644 - 258 = 1386lbs. Our combat radius fuel is (1386 *0.85 /2) = 589lbs

Our planned combat radius must not exceed;

589lbs / 280 PPH = 2.1 hours at 176 KTAS = 370 miles (with 1000lb bombload)

Quick reminder the Ba 65 Series II data are;

325lbs / 280 PPH = 1.16 hours at 192 KTAS = 223 miles (with 440lb bombload)

At this point let's remember that the superb 1,030hp Rolls Royce Merlin was designed to power the Fairey Battle, not the much later Hurricane and Spitfire. Compared to the 1000hp Ba 65 the 1030hp Battle is much heavier, has a much bigger bombload, much heavier crew load, yet also a bigger fuel load and cruises efficiently at higher altitude. In March 1937 Vmax = 209 seemed quite impressive, but the significant 9% speed advantage of the Ba 65 Series II for interception avoidance was crucial when the Ba 65 Series II moved to North Africa to fight the British.

It is worth noting that the *empty equipped* weight of a Fairey Battle in a combat zone was more than a thousand pounds heavier than the dry ex factory weight normally quoted in the 'Boys Big Book of Wonderplanes'. The Microsoft description 'empty weight' must not be allowed to equate to dry ex factory weight without guns, or ammo, or avionics, or oil, all of which are additional. Of course the Battle also needed a heavy weight of engine coolant to be 'empty equipped'. The empty equipped weight of a Ba 65 Series II must not be confused with its ex factory weight either, but it did not require the heavy mass of coolant and radiators needed in a Battle or Ju 87. Unlike Junkers Mitsubishi avoided the mistake of using a liquid cooled engine in the Ki-30.


ENEMY CAPABILITY MATTERS.

In Spain from 1937 the Ba 65 was opposed by the superb and significantly faster Polikarpov I-16 Rata which was a real threat. Three years later in 1940 in North Africa, (while the Battle of Britain was in full swing), the RAF could not spare Hurricane and Spitfire interceptors for service over Western Egypt and the 229 KTAS Ba 65 Series II was opposed only by the 220 KTAS Gloster Gladiator air superiority fighter. Suddenly the huge compromises needed to achieve 229 KTAS were a little more worthwhile.

However the price paid to avoid interception by a Gladiator in the Ba 65 was very high. The problem with any conclusion that it was a price worth paying is that even in 1936 all single engined 'assaltatori' were already out of date due to the deployment of the Tupolev SB-2 Katiuska during 1935. What's more the only slightly later Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna SB clone (Vmax 232 KTAS) was faster than the Ba 65 Srs II and could deliver a normal bombload, (1000 Kg), more than double that of the Battle or Blenheim and five times greater than the Ba 65.

The Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna schnell bomber flew combat missions over Spain from November 1937 and was almost immediately and eagerly procured by the IJAAF. Eighty-five Fiat B.R.20 Cicognas (Vmax 232 KTAS) were flying air assault over China (also opposed only by 220 KTAS Chinese Air Force Gloster Gladiators) from mid 1938, before the Ba 65 Series II (Vmax 229 KTAS) began much more modest combat operations over Spain in October 1938.

There is a perfectly good reason that Fiat B.R.20 Squadrons were not attached to Ba 65 Groups. All single engined 'assaltatori' lacked both bombload and velocity compared to faster twin engined schnell bombers, with much larger bombloads, and those schnell bombers pre-date the Ba 65. German propaganda concerning the 'wonderful' Ju 87 is still consumed as though it were fact. The reality is that the 1030hp retractable gear Fairey Battle (Vmax = 209 KTAS) was faster than the fixed gear 1200hp Ju 87B-1 (Vmax = 206 KTAS), and yet by mid 1940 neither was remotely schnell enough to perform the air assault mission unescorted and both had compromised bomb loads.

Both the Battle (normal 1,000lb bomb load) and the Ju 87B (normal 1,100lb bombload) needed fighter escort for anything resembling deep daylight penetration of enemy air superiority else they were easily intercepted and slaughtered. The 229 KTAS Ba 65 series II was 9% faster than the Battle and 10% faster than the Ju 87B, but had to be single crew and carry a very tiny bombload to achieve that critical speed advantage. *However* pitted against the obsolete 220 KTAS Gladiator over Egypt during 1940, and again over Iraq in 1941 it was just fast enough to evade interception, whilst a 206 KTAS Ju 87B-1 could not evade even a Gloster Gladiator in any campaign.

By mid 1938 both Italy and Japan had fully realised that the 2 x 1000hp Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna (Vmax = 232 KTAS) was a faster, better tactical day bomber than any single engined aeroplane could possibly be and were flying most air assault missions accordingly. Loss rates were low per hundred sorties but many sorties were needed to hit the targets from medium level, (typically from 3000M AGL), never entering the flak envelope of those tactical targets. But as the Ba 65 demonstrated in the 'Battle for the Ebro' some assalto missions required precision high angle delivery of unguided weapons, even though none required dive bombing.

The RAF and BAF would not grasp that the 1030hp Battle (Vmax = 209 KTAS) could not achieve the assalto mission until June 1940 and the RAF would then substitute the 1680hp Blenheim SB (Vmax = 226 KTAS), but what the RAF really needed in North Africa was the 2400hp A-20 Boston (Vmax = 257 KTAS) and its more powerful and faster successors. Fortunately the RAF had the Douglas Boston a year after France, but a year before the USAAC.

The Ba 65 was a poor CAS asset and was not squandered in that role over Spain. Unlike the Blenheim the Ba 65 was unsuccessful as an interceptor and utterly useless at night. Unlike the Battle it had far too little endurance and too few crew to be relegated to fly maritime patrol or maritime convoy escort missions. Unlike the Blenheim it had no success in the anti shipping role, but all of them were simply too small to make really useful air assault assets.

Despite misleading German propaganda promoting the advantages of dive bombing air assault actually required a schnell Katiuska / Cicogna/ Boston / Maryland sized twin engine aeroplane dropping huge numbers of 'big' bombs to bust small bunkers and small bridges. The Ju 87 was saved from obscurity by the 1200hp Junkers 211D engine introduced in the Ju 87B-1 in 1939. That superb engine allowed it to carry a single 500Kg (1,100lb) bomb which had significant application in bunker busting, bridge busting and anti shipping strike, but with Vmax = 206 and slower than the 1937 Fairey Battle the most famous Stuka of all simply wasn't capable of flying the air assault mission. Like the Fairey Battle is was just too slow and had no hope of surviving a mission 160 miles behind the Egyptian FLOT unescorted, even in 1940. It could only attack targets within the tiny escort combat radius of contemporary jaegers and in reality from mid 1940 onwards the Luftwaffe sturmkampf mission increasingly had to be flown by the much faster Ju 88A-4 schnell bomber (Vmax = 254 KTAS), or not at all. Germany insisted that even the Ju 88A must be able to dive bomb since it had an anti shipping role.

The Nomad together with its Ju 87 and Ki-30 clones were deemed to need fixed robust landing gear to operate from barely prepared landing strips very near the front line. The Breda 65 and Battle by contrast both had retractable landing gear requiring operation from prepared airfields further behind the front line. In Spain such airfields were fairly plentiful, but in North Africa those airfields were very few and far between, and could be a long away behind the FLOT. However before jumping forward to North Africa in late 1940 we should study the deployment of the Ba 65 elsewhere and earlier.


SERVICE IN ITALY - TROUBLED START - DELIVERIES DELAYED.

I will explain the handling problems of the Ba 65 in detail within 'How to survive flying the Ba 65.txt'. The two seaters had even worse handling. However as soon as the original single seaters began to partially replace the Caproni A.P.1 and Breda Ba 64 in the Stormi d'Assalto based in Italy during 1936, the Ba 65 was involved in a series of accidents all of which were due to pilot error, but all of which the squadron aircrew blamed on design deficiencies.

Morale was so low, and the accidents so numerous, that Breda were ordered to delay significant production of Series I Breda 65s with GR14K engines until the never ending series of accident enquiries had run their course. A handful of Ba 65s were issued to the existing A.P.1 and Ba 64 squadrons during 1936, but a significant number of the new Ba 65s crashed and then all the survivors were shipped to Spain during the winter of 1936-37 as described above.

Delivery to squadrons in Italy continued slowly during the rest of 1937, but by 31st December 1937 only twenty Ba 65s were in squadron service in Italy and no Italian based squadron had fully re-equipped. Plans to increase the number of 'assalto' squadrons from eight to twenty, (all serving in a brigade commanded by Colonel Mecozzi and with nine aircraft issued per squadron), were quickly reduced to a plan for just twelve 'assalto' squadrons so that the Breda 64 could be prematurely retired during 1939. The inventory of Ba 65s within the Regia Aeronautica actually peaked at 123 in July 1939 of which 103 were issued to squadrons with 20 in reserve.

Among other allegations of continuing negligent design squadron pilots insisted that the Ba 65 was stalling at low angles of attack. It wasn't, but Breda were forced to license production of Handley Page automatic slats to 'solve' a problem that did not exist and which slats could not possibly solve. All Series II Ba 65s operated by the Regia Aeronautica had Handley Page automatic slats.

The Ba 65 Series II, (as contained in this FS release), entered service in Italy in May 1938, but did not make its combat debut in Spain until October. Adding slats made no difference and could not eliminate pilot error, so early Series II deliveries produced just as many pilot errors and accidents.


PROPAGANDA versus REALITY.

Mussolini was very keen to show off the latest 'Assaltatori' to Hitler during his visit to Italy in May 1938. Eighteen Series II Ba 65s and seven A.P.1s from the 50th Stormo carried out a live strafing demonstration, on Furbara airfield, but did not attempt to bomb having no under-wing racks. The Ba 65 wing commander was ordered to take off with a combined pilot, fuel, ammo and bomb load of 1165Kg (2563lbs) which was a useful load 65Kg more than even the most optimistic Italian propaganda had claimed was possible.

Each time take off had to be aborted. The Ba 65 was simply too heavy even to lift off. It finally managed to stagger into the air with a useful load of 900Kg (1980lbs) representing, a pilot, ammo, standard fuel and a 766lb bombload, but its pilot Lieutenant Colonel Savarino reported that the handling with that load was marginal and incompatible with combat operations. Under combat conditions, bomb load did not exceed 440lbs with standard fuel.

Some histories and a larger number of websites plagiarising those histories make ridiculous claims concerning the maximum bomb load of the Ba 65. Their authors have first mistranslated 'useful load' as 'bomb load' and have then just accepted propaganda claims of a useful load of 1100Kg which was wholly incompatible with real combat operations. Real aeroplanes need crew, fuel, oil, ammo etc to fly combat missions and they need a margin of performance greater than that needed to stagger into the air for a local propaganda demonstration.

Only Regia Aeronautica Ba 65s assigned to combat zones were ever retro-fitted with much needed but missing external bomb pylons. In North Africa (only) they could, and sometimes did, carry both internal and external weapon loads at the same time. The external load was then always limited to only 2 x 50Kg bombs (100Kg = 220lbs) for attacking dugouts and tanks, plus only 50 internal 2Kg grenades or incendiaries for attacks on soft targets, (usually artillery gun crews), during the same sortie, *unless* fuel was drained to allow an exactly equal overload of internal cluster munitions to be carried on a strike of appropriately reduced combat radius.


HEAVY RESTRICTIONS.

By October 1938 (concerning the Ba 65) the Regia Aeronautica had,

1) Forbidden all aerobatics

2) Forbidden all low level flying

3) Forbidden the carriage of a second crew member

4) Forbidden carriage of maximum bombload (880lbs) even with reduced fuel.

5) Ordered tail ballast to be added to all series II single seaters to counter the heavier Fiat engine

However two seaters continued in use single crew. Equipment pertinent to the second crew member was stripped. Hardly ideal given that the Regia Aeronautica was seeking volunteers to fly the Ba 65 in combat in Spain! Of course all of this also relates to why Bredas in Spain were only tagging along behind Fiat B.R.20s at medium level, even on very short range strike missions.


Ba 65 Srs I .....RELEGATED then STORED.

By October 1938 all surviving Ba 65 Series Is had been relegated to the bomber interceptor (zerstorer) role and service overseas within the 2nd Stormo Caccia Terrestre (2nd Fighter/Interceptor Wing) based in Libya where they were extremely unlikely to see any combat. The forty to fifty survivors were divided into six squadriglie. The decision to re-equip the 2nd Stormo only with interceptors left Libya without adequate fighter (jaeger) protection. Consequently the Series I Bredas were steadily replaced by Fiat C.R.32 biplane jaegers during 1939 and all surviving Series I Ba 65s then progressively and slowly returned to Italy for storage as an emergency assalto reserve.


Ba 65 Srs II becomes OPERATIONAL.

During early service in Italy in 1938 both assalto stormi flying the Ba 65 Series II were based around Rome. Most were actually based at Ciampino, but using Rome / Urbe (LIRU), which is ten miles north of Ciampino, for training sorties within FS9 will give us a better impression of relevant 1930s airfields.

However within a few months both Stormi moved to their operational bases. By January 1939 thirty-two Series II aircraft served in the 5th Stormo d'Assalto with five squadriglie in Milan (Lonate Pozzolo) and twenty-one more served with the six squadriglie of the 50th Stormo d'Assalto at Treviso (LIPS). To replicate the size and nature of the peacetime 1938-39 operational air bases of the Ba 65s in Italy realistically it is best to use Milan / Bresso (LIMB) in FS9. Each Stormo d'Assalto still had much older Ba 64s in service alongside the Series II Ba 65 and the 50th at Treviso had ten other assorted aircraft to make up the number on strength to forty-one. The Ba 65 was still only half of their equipment. The 5th Stormo in Milan had twelve Ba 64s still on strength for a total of 44 aircraft. For reasons which are entirely unclear the Ba 64 was retained in front line service while Ba 65 Srs Is were first relegated to Libya as interceptors and then withdrawn to storage.

The expected enemy was France not Switzerland. The Ba65 crews in Milan were training to attack westward across the Alps into France, whether Italy attacked France or vice versa. This required combat aircraft designed for high altitude operation. Forward air bases such as Aosta would be needed for a fighter Stormo and most bases around Turin would also need to house fighter Stormi to protect Turin.

'Assaltatori' had to operate from much further behind the expected FLOT and the (no avionics) navigational challenge was considerable given the mountainous nature of the terrain. Milan to the French border east of Courcheval is 93 miles. During peacetime training the 5th Stormo could only navigate up to the point at which the potential MSRs crossed the French border, making simulated attacks just inside the border, but nothing stops us simulating what might have happened in 1940 if the Ba 65 Series II had not been judged a failure. Tourist maps of France and Italy are readily available. (else use Plan-G, see later), and we can simulate the difficulty of high altitude raids westwards across the Alps as far as Lyon, (and back to Bresso), all year round. Indeed its seems likely that targeting supply routes from Lyon, while operating from a base in Milan, drove the original assalto specification drawn up by Mecozzi in 1933.

War against Yugoslavia was a slightly more distant possibility but the 50th Stormo which had moved forward to Treviso was located for that possibility. This also required training for a high mountain crossing to attack MSRs emanating from Ljubljana and Zagreb, but I suppose the 50th Stormo trained by making flights as far as the Austrian border near Villach / Klagenfurt intending to penetrate at 4500M, or at the base of cloud only if lower. These training sorties hardly differed from the Ansaldo SVA 5 sorties of 1918 and were just as lacking in navigation technology!


GROUNDED!

None of the above stopped the accidents. By the end of October 1938 there had been eight fatal Ba 65 Series II crashes in ten months and all Ba 65s in Italy were grounded until February 1939 even though combat operations continued in Spain and peace time Series I interceptor training continued in Libya.


ROLE TRAINERS.

After the grounding of the Ba 65 Series II single seaters was lifted, in February 1939, some then served briefly as role trainers with the Assalto training school at Foggia (LIBF), but when that school moved to Rimini in November 1939 their Ba 65s were scrapped. Let's by all means use the Ba 65 to explore south and central Italy VFR from Foggia using a tourist map and no avionics (or Plan-G).


REMANUFACTURED, REPLACED, REDEPLOYED then DISPERSED.

In April 1939 all Ba 65s Series II delivered to Italian squadrons as two seaters (just a little number) were withdrawn for re-manufacture as single seaters with any rear cockpit removed and faired over. In July 1939 all surviving Series I two seaters (now all in storage) became subject to the same re-manufacturing order. Contrary to reports in some histories plagiarised on the internet the RA had no two seat Ba 65s by September 1939 and they had almost certainly refused delivery of some they had ordered.

The 5th Stormo d'Assalto had by then almost wholly re-equipped with the very fast, but deeply flawed, 2 x 1000hp (Piaggio P.XI) Breda 88 Lince (Lynx) twin engine schnell bomber (Vmax = 264 KTAS), retaining only nine flyable Ba 65 Series IIs. They eventually deployed to Sardinia in preparation for air assault operations against Corsica, if Italy decided to attack the French Empire, if and when German forces ever brought France itself close to surrender. The 5th Stormo stood down their last flyable Ba 65 Series II in May 1940 so a few of their Ba 65s were based in Sardinia very briefly, but were withdrawn from operations a few weeks before Italy declared war on France.

It was the intention that both surviving assault Stormi would re-equip with the twin engined Ba 88 Lince schnell bomber to perform the assalto mission. To that end each Stormo received some Caproni Ca.310 Libeccios to provide multi engine conversion training and as 'place holders' until the Ba 88 Lince arrived in strength. In practice the Ba 88 Lince was such a failure in service with the 5th Stormo, (before and after combat operations), that plans to also re-equip the 50th were dropped, but the 50th nevertheless received some Caproni Ca.310 'place holders'. This did not indicate an intention to turn the 50th into a multi role Stormo. It remained dedicated to deep penetration daylight air assault.

When France declared war on Germany in September 1939 the 50th Stormo still flying mostly the Ba 65 Series II was quickly redeployed, well out of the way of any possible combat with anyone, to Benghazi in Libya (use Qaryat Al Karmal = HL0I not HLLB to replicate Breda desert training operations under WW2 conditions). Unlike the GR14K the Fiat A.80 engines had no appropriate sand filters and the Fiat engines were soon failing, increasing the accident rate further. However redeployment of all surviving flyable RA Ba 65s to Benghazi in September 1939 ensured that no Ba 65s had to attempt Assalto missions opposed by fast modern monoplane French fighters in June 1940.

The RA had accepted delivery of eighty GR14K powered Series Is. Total production of all varieties of Ba 65, for all customers, seems to have been only 218, of which 200 were originally ordered by the Regia Aeronautica, some of which, (mostly two seaters, but including some single seaters), were diverted to other customers, some delivered with different engines, without ever reaching the RA. Histories plagiarised on the web claiming that the RA still had 154 Ba 65s on charge on 1st June 1940 are very wide of the mark. That was the paper strength of the two relevant Stormi d'Assalto, but only 78 Ba 65s remained in RA service, of which only 23 were 'operational', all with 50th Stormo d'Assalto in Libya.

As June 1940 approached and with Italy opportunistically about to declare war on both the French and British Empires, and with the new Breda 88 Lince schnell bomber suffering serious problems of its own, the order was given to dismantle all Ba 65s Srs II and ship the parts back to Italy for storage. In practice this order was simply ignored by the 50th Stormo as it would have left them with only a single squadron of Caproni Ca.310 Libeccio 'place holders'. It seems that forty-three of the sixty-six Ba 65s the 50th Stormo had on charge were instead withdrawn from use and just dispersed all around the perimeter of Benghazi airfield without ever being dismantled. In theory the entire operational strength of the 50th Stormo d'Assalto was now just seven 2 x 470hp Caproni Ca 310 Libeccios (Vmax = 197 KTAS) in a single squadriglia, but in practice they continued to use twenty three Ba 65s they had been ordered to stand down.

Not long before Italy declared war, (on 6th June 1940), the 50th Stormo moved west to Tripoli so that it would be in position to attack French supply choke points inside the French colony of Tunisia, in the event that French army units based there invaded Libya. In practice the 50th flew twenty-three of their 'dismantled' Ba 65s to Tripoli as well as the seven 'place holder' Capronis.


REPRIEVED.

It was very quickly obvious that most French colonists, including colonial troop commanders everywhere had decided either not to oppose fascism, or to actually fight for fascism. On the other hand British tanks immediately invaded Libya from the opposite direction in an attempt to seize the Italian colonial port of Tobruk.

The 50th Stormo having been deployed in exactly the wrong direction, after a relatively brief period in Tripoli in the west of Libya, quickly redeployed again to Tobruk (HL0L) in the east to fight the British. Again it seems that (up to) twenty-three Ba 65s which should have been dismantled flew immediately and directly from Tripoli to Tobruk. The seven Capronis 'place holders' also redeployed to Tobruk and then flew just two anti tank CAS missions before the survivors were so shot up by small arms fire, and morale was so low, that they were all struck off.

In theory the 50th Stormo d'Assalto, now based at Tobruk and right up against the British front line and increasingly threatened by advancing British tanks, now had no operational aircraft at all, and the only aeroplanes they actually had 'on charge' were useless for anti tank sorties because the Ba 65 was an assalto with no external bomb racks for high angle CAS. Consequently Captain Duilio Fanali was then ordered to work out how many of the abandoned Breda 65s dispersed at Benghazi were repairable and to bring them back into combat service. More to the point he was also ordered to order local manufacture of, and fitting of, the missing but vital external bomb racks, so that they could fly emergency anti tank CAS missions.

Ferried to Tobruk as they were repaired and upgraded with external bomb racks Ba 65s began to fly emergency anti tank sorties from Tobruk on 15th June 1940. It is not clear how many Ba 65s were repaired and flew combat missions in June 1940, but by the end of that month there were only five flyable Ba 65s in Libya. Serving in the 159th Squadriglia they together with five Fiat C.R.32 fighter-bombers rushed out from Italy were the only flyable aircraft in the entire 50th Stormo d'Assalto which was no longer performing its assigned role and was flying only emergency CAS to defend its own airfield perimeter.


EMERGENCY CAS then BRITISH RETREAT.

The nature of the motorised and mechanised warfare in the North African desert allowed easy 'capture' of desert terrain with the FLOT moving rapidly, but at the same time it was impossible to supply a force large enough to resist a determined counter attack, and one sand dune was not obviously worth more than the next or last.

As the 50th Stormo began combat operations from Tobruk (HL0L) the FLOT was dangerously close and if Tobruk was to be held there was no choice but to throw every available aircraft into high risk CAS sorties against advancing British tanks and dug in artillery. Later when the Italian Army recaptured ground from the British it would take time to repair the only airfield which had been captured (Amseat = As Sallum = HE0J) and it would be needed, (or only suitable for), fixed gear fighters and fighter bomber biplanes flying anti tank sorties with tiny bombs until December. Consequently the 50th Stormo remained at Tobruk until December 1940 ever further behind the FLOT.

Following the Italian counter attack the British were soon retreating from over the Libyan border towards their immediate source of supply at Sidi Barrani inside Egypt. As the Italian Army advanced out of Libya into Egypt their supply lines from Tobruk became stretched in turn. The entire campaign in that theatre eventually became a war to deny supply.


JULY 1940 - AIR ASSAULT RESUMES.

The Fiat A.80 engine was prone to overheating and was poorly suited to North Africa. There had never been any intention to station the Ba 65 series II in hot locations, but stories plagiarised on the internet of Fiat engined aircraft acquiring Mistral Major engines are untrue. What really happened was that during July the stored Ba 65 Series Is were rushed out from Italy as fast as they could be brought back to flyable condition. All new arrivals were fitted with external bomb racks in Benghazi before continuing to Tobruk, but at all times the abandoned Fiat engined Ba 65s at Benghazi were the primary source of both replacements and spare parts by cannibalisation.

Having failed to procure bomb racks for any RA Ba 65s before the declaration of war, manufacturing them in Libya, then fitting both the racks and the necessary control runs now delayed the flow of Ba 65s from Benghazi to Tobruk. The 50th desperately needed aircraft with external bomb racks for anti tank missions and so stored 1 x 600hp Fiat C.R.32quater (Vmax = 195 KTAS) biplane fighter bombers were rushed out from Italy too. By the end of July 1940 the 50th Stormo in Tobruk was equipped with fourteen Ba 65 A.80 (159th Squadriglia) and nine Ba 65 K14 (168th Squadriglia) together with about twenty Fiat C.R.32quater divided between the 160th and 167th Squadriglia, but many of each type, although at Tobruk, were under repair or awaiting spare parts as dispersed Ba 65s at Benghazi were cannibalised.

With the British now in retreat the C.R.32 fighter-bombers now undertook most of the CAS sorties whilst the Ba 65s 'assaltatori' began to prosecute the British MSRs deep inside Egypt. Contrary to the account given by some histories, and plagiarised on the internet, no one was embarrassed that the C.R.32quater procured by the RA to specialise in the CAS role was better at it than the Ba 65 procured and highly optimised for the assalto role. There had never been any intention to squander assalto assets in CAS sorties, but whenever the only available airfield (at Tobruk) was in danger of being overrun by British tanks every available aircraft flew emergency CAS.

Now with Italian forces advancing, during major daylight battles between As Sallum and Sidi Barrani on 25th, and again on 27th July, large British daylight supply convoys to or from Sidi Barrani existed on the MSRs and were continuously attacked by the Bredas while the C.R.32s flew CAS at the FLOT. Over the UK the 'Battle of Britain' was beginning and for the time being Egypt was a minor campaign for the RAF.

To a large extent the entire North African campaign relied on coastal ports and the single coastal road that linked them. During daylight strafing attacks truck convoys could easily scatter off road, but they could not convoy off road. Both sides moved most of their supply by night, with lights off. Consequently many Ba 65 missions soon consisted of anti vehicle minelaying sorties as late in the afternoon as possible, and along remote parts of the coast road far beyond the FLOT, leaving as little daylight for detection and mine clearance as possible.

It is worth clarifying at this point that 'Stormi d'Assalto' were *never* tasked with 'Army Co-operation / Observation' missions. Like the RAF and USAAC the RA had procured aircraft optimised for, or better suited to that role which were assembled into relevant Stormi, to deliver tactical reconnaissance and artillery observation for the Italian Army. The RA army co-operation missions in North Africa were being flown by the 1 x 560hp Meridionali Ro.37bis biplane (Vmax = 178 KTAS) and varieties of the twin engined Ca.300 MRCA optimised for those roles and serving in relevant units.


AUGUST 1940 - AIR to AIR COMBAT.

As the British FLOT quickly stabilised only just inside the Egyptian border and to the west of the important north - south road from the coast to the important RAF airfield at Siwa Oasis the British created a forward supply depot at Bir Taib el Esem, (above ground under camouflage nets). On 4th August 1940 Bir Taib el Esem was strafed and lay down assaulted, (using incendiaries), by six Ba 65s with six Fiat C.R.32quater fighter-bombers flying top cover. The arrival of the Bredas in their attack pattern co-incided with the passage overhead of a Lysander from Sidi Barrani, escorted by four Gladiators, en-route to photograph Italian defences. The four Gladiators bounced the six Bredas and quickly shot down two of them. However the Gladiators became over preoccupied with their attack on the Bredas and were in turn bounced by the six Fiats who shot down two of the four Gladiators.

As the two surviving Gladiators attempted egress the next strike wave consisting of three Ba 65s escorted by twelve much more capable 1 x 840hp Fiat C.R.42s (Vmax 243 KTAS) from a fighter Stormo, (also based at Tobruk), arrived over Bir Taib el Esem and the twelve C.R.42s quickly managed to shoot down a third Gladiator. These were the only Bredas ever shot down by RAF fighters. The Fiat C.R.32s in that air battle were the 160th Squadriglia commanded by Captain Fanali who had earlier commanded the 65th Squadriglia over Spain. He was credited with shooting down one of the Gladiators.

When Ba 65s operated in mixed strike packages with Fiat C.R.32quaters from their own Stormo the Bredas had to slow down significantly so that their agile fighter-bomber escorts could keep up, minimising their combat radius. This wasn't a problem when escorted by the latest Italian air superiority fighter, the C.R.42 Falco. Let's pause to remember that the Fiat C.R.42 Falco biplane entered service long after the Fiat G.50 Freccia monoplane and alongside the Macchi C.200 Saetta monoplane. The brand new Falco was easily superior to the 1937 vintage Gladiator, but it still lacked the fuel tankage needed to escort 'assaltatori' to targets significantly beyond the FLOT.


SEPTEMBER 1940 - SIDI BARRANI blitzkrieg

The targets for the Bredas, still operating from Tobruk (HL0L), soon became the distant British defensive positions outside Sidi Barrani and the coastal supply route beyond to Mersa Matruh. The Ba 65s could attack those targets unescorted and were now shaping the battlefield all the way to Mersa Matruh in the hope and expectation of another sweeping blitzkrieg advance. By the end of September the 50th had only ten flyable Ba 65 'assaltatori' and eighteen flyable C.R.32 fighter-bombers. There were no further Ba 65s in storage in Italy or available for repair / cannibalisation at Benghazi. Repairs at Tobruk were not keeping up with the rate at which Ba 65s were being damaged in combat, and by accidents.

It was at this moment that the high command in Libya sent a letter to 50th Stormo's C.O. inviting Spanish Civil War veterans to choose an appropriately martial name for both the Fiat C.R.32 and Breda Ba 65 for use in future propaganda. This request elicited only cynical laughter from the tired and hard pressed crews. At least thirteen Ba 65s had been lost in the previous eight weeks (7% losses per week) and the 50th Stormo once again had nowhere near enough assalti to shape the Egyptian battlefield, or to deny adequate supply to the British.

The Battle of Britain had quickly concluded with the Luftwaffe yielding RAF air supremacy over the UK by day. Hawker Hurricanes interceptors and their pilots could now be released and shipped for service over Egypt, but they never occupied the same airspace as the Bredas which only ever faced slower Gladiator fighter opposition.


OCTOBER 1940 - SCHLACHTKAMPF again - COUNTER AIR begins

With too few 'assaltatori' available the September Italian blitzkrieg into Egypt soon failed and the FLOT sustained well west of Sidi Barrani, and still extended all the way south and west of Siwa Oasis (HE0O) which remained in RAF hands. Ba 65s were again squandered in emergency CAS anti tank missions. On 8th October the most senior surviving Ba 65 pilot Captain Dell'Oro commanding the 159th Squadriglia, (who had commanded the attack on Bir Taib el Esem in August), was killed in action when he was shot down by British AAA near Bir-Kamsat. After their commander's death the aircrew of the 159th obtained authorization to paint his name on their aircraft.

On 18th October six Ba 65s escorted by seven C.R.32s attacked the RAF airfield at Siwa Oasis (HE0O) to reduce British CAS capability. This was almost certainly the first time Ba 65s had been tasked for lay down attacks on an enemy airfield anywhere. Incendiaries not fragmentation grenades were dropped, but of course the target aeroplanes of the RAF were fabric covered and would have burned well if hit. In practice the raid did little damage and the Italian advance remained stalled.


NOVEMBER 1940 - BRITISH COUNTER ATTACK.

Having failed to achieve the mission objective on 18th October the Siwa Oasis airfield raid was repeated on 7th November this time with eighteen C.R.32s flying both escort for six Ba 65s, and then operating as fighter-bombers. During October and November the 50th were unable to muster more than six flyable Ba 65s on any date even though C.R.32 numbers were steadily increasing.

The second Siwa Oasis raid failed again and the British counter attacked before the end of November. After a few days of fierce resistance, flying emergency high angle anti tank sorties, and emergency lay down anti artillery sorties, the morale of Italian assalto and fighter-bomber pilots was so low that they were all sent on leave together during the British counter attack. Without any CAS for Italian troops at the FLOT the British attack shattered the morale of the entire Italian Army, which was soon retreating or surrendering. The British falteringly began what would soon become their first sweeping advance.


DECEMBER 1940 - RETURN TO DUTY

After a much needed period of rest for the pilots, and aircraft repair by their ground crews, the 50th Stormo re-assembled right up on the FLOT at the fully repaired Amseat (HE0J) on 9th December, now with eleven flyable Ba 65s plus a larger number of C.R.32s. However the 50th were still flying mostly intensive ultra short range emergency high angle anti tank or emergency lay down anti artillery missions in defence of Amseat through December and into January 1941.


JANUARY 1941 - LAST FLYABLE ITALIAN Ba 65 SHOT DOWN

The last of the eleven Ba 65s available in early December was shot down by British AAA on 12th January 1941 and by then the 50th Stormo had just three C.R.32 fighter-bombers in flying condition and able to provide emergency CAS. The Stormo was formally disbanded and aircrew survivors were ordered back to Italy on 14th February 1941. Many histories, plagiarised on the internet, incorrectly report this as the date on which the last flyable Ba 65 was destroyed. No 50th Stormo aircraft escaped the British onslaught.

Nobody knows how many Ba 65s flew combat missions in North Africa, over the six months from mid June 1940 to mid January 1941, but it was obviously more than the twenty-three which flew combat missions in Spain. It is possible that more than sixty of the seventy-four that survived when Italy declared war were brought back into service and flew combat missions, but it was probably fewer with combat and accident losses averaging two per week for twenty six weeks until all operational Ba 65s had been lost. The number of sorties flown is unknown too, but was probably not far short of the almost two thousand flown in eighteen months of combat over Spain. The aircraft loss rate in Africa was eventually 100%, and pilot loss rates were also high (but unknown) as Bredas were squandered in the CAS role at the FLOT. The 50th Stormo was awarded a Silver Medal unit citation, (For the Brave).


IRAQ.

Britain had seized Mesopotamia from the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) during WW1. After re-arranging its borders to include all likely oil fields the British renamed the resulting territory as 'Iraq'. After installing a compliant puppet 'King', in 1931 the British granted Iraq independence subject to having the continuing right to maintain military bases of all kinds within the Kingdom of Iraq, and the right to exercise continuing control over Iraq's foreign policy and military strength.

The British did not object when in 1937 their puppet King decided to order fifteen two seat Ba 65s, thirteen of them with Breda M1 turrets mounting a 7.7mm machine gun, and two as dual control trainers, to re-equip 5 Sqn Royal Iraqi Air Force. The British looked forward to comprehensive testing and intelligence evaluation. These Iraqi two seaters introduced the Fiat A.80 engine and were therefore the first ever Series II Ba 65s, but they lacked the Handley Page automatic slats fitted to RA Series II aircraft. Flight testing at Baghdad began in November 1937 and was followed by intensive dual control training with a Breda supplied instructor. RIAF squadron service followed early in 1938. It seems that the RIAF crashed only one, some time during 1940. IAF Ba 65 combat operations over Iraq and the events of 1941 are described separately below.


CHILE.

Chile decided to buy seventeen Series II single seaters and three two seaters with dual controls during 1937. These aircraft, with modified landing gear, were powered by the 1,000 hp Piaggio P.XI engine which was 75Kg (165lbs) lighter than the Fiat A.80, allowing a much needed equal increase in useful load. This engine upgrade delayed flight testing in Chile until January 1939.

For reasons of commonality with other Chilean equipment the Breda 12.7mm machine guns had been replaced with Danish Madsens. 'Operational' deployment with 4 Grupo de Ataque e Instruccion Avanzada at El Bosque (SCBQ) finally began in March 1939.

Two quickly crashed, leading to an orchestrated press campaign calling for Italy to give the Chilean taxpayers their money back and calling for a boycott of Italian consumer goods. Again the official enquiries showed that both crashes had been due to pilot error, but all the Bredas were grounded after just eight weeks of 4 Grupo service. Italy ignored all protests and Chilean use of the Bredas resumed more than a year later in the summer of 1940. There do not seem to have been any further crashes in Chile and the Ba 65s were then 'semi operational' until 1944 when they were scrapped. Histories claiming they were ever based at Los Cerrillos (SCTI) seem to be misinformed.

Tourist maps of Chile are readily available and will be no worse for pioneer era navigation training purposes than the maps available to the Chilean Air Force of 1939-44. It would be a shame to miss the opportunity to conduct Ba 65 training operations from SCBQ. The potential wartime targets are of course Argentine supply routes from Mendoza and San Rafael which Argentina might have used to supply an invasion, or their defence against a Chilean invasion. Training to attack the MSRs as they cross and descend from the Andes (*on both sides*) is a potentially interesting VFR simulation.

Some histories of the Ba 65 assert that Chile sold their Ba 65s to Paraguay. This seems to be without foundation.


PORTUGAL.

Portugal purchased twelve two seat Series II with the M1 Breda turret mounting a 7.7mm machine gun, and two dual control trainers. The Breda 7.7mm machine guns were replaced with 7.7mm Brownings (probably of British manufacture). By then Italy was well aware that the Ba 65 required extensive conversion training by experienced Breda instructors and so all Portuguese pilots were given lengthy training with the 5th Stormo of the Regia Aeronautica at Milan during 1939. Probably for that reason the Portuguese Air Force seem to have crashed none of them.

They were all delivered during 1939, but in February 1941 a storm rolled in from the Atlantic and destroyed their hangar. Every single one was crushed. Some people say the squadron aircrew held a party to celebrate! They were based at Lisbon / Sintra (LPST). Tourist maps of Portugal are also readily available. The only potential 'targets' for training sorties are the MSRs from Spain close to the Spanish border, but they are easy to locate and follow in both directions and therefore make ideal elementary VFR navigation training sorties in the Ba 65 before we attempt more difficult navigational challenges.


CHINA (almost).

Italy made every attempt to supply both sides of the Sino-Japanese war. Japan was Italy's most lucrative combat aircraft export customer, but Japan did not make the mistake of buying Bredas. Italy hoped that China might be an even more lucrative customer and Italian trade missions offered extensive technology transfer deals. These deals included construction of what would later become Nanchang aircraft, but which at the time was the Sino-Italian National Aircraft Works, built by Italy and equipped with Italian machine tools to build thirty Series II Ba 65s under licence.

Fiat engines would be shipped from Italy. However China insisted on more powerful Pratt and Whitney engines and so Breda production never happened in China. The original Nanchang factory built just half a dozen Savoia S.M.81Bs bombers instead. A single Pratt & Whitney engined Ba 65 prototype was assembled and tested by Breda in Italy.


HUNGARY (not really).

Some histories of the Ba 65 assert that the HuAF acquired stored Breda 65s for use as sturmkampf role trainers during WW2. However they had all been expended over Egypt by January 1941 making that impossible.


SOVIET UNION (not really).

Some historians have claimed that Mussolini allowed Breda to sell ten Ba 65s to the USSR for combat evaluation. That claim is false but Breda were allowed to provide two flawed Ba 64s to the Soviet Union for evaluation.


GIVEN AWAY!

Breda did however obtain permission to give away single Ba 65s for intelligence and combat evaluation by the air forces of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Finland, Lithuania, Japan and Switzerland. None of the recipients showed any significant interest in placing follow up orders. These aircraft seem to be undelivered and unwanted (probably two seat) aircraft originally destined for the RA.


1941 - Ba 65 COMBAT OPERATIONS from BAGHDAD.

From April to June 1941 the pace of WW2 accelerated quickly and changed course dramatically. The French Empire, (which ruled Syria and Lebanon as the French Levant), had long supported an Islamic insurgency into Iraq, intended to topple the British puppet King. The French backed insurgency required both RAF counter insurgency sorties from RAF Habbaniyah, (use OR0Q not OR1H), and by the RIAF from RIAF Baghdad and RIAF Mosul. The Ba 65 was in fact rather well suited to counter insurgency operations within Iraq, (towards Syria), while operating from Baghdad. 5 Squadron RIAF were actually based at Baghdad / Al Rachid (OR0G), but to replicate Iraqi air bases of 1941 it is more appropriate to use OR0S = Baghdad / Qasr Tall Mihl in FS9 instead.

However, for reasons explained below, early in 1941 German intelligence frustrated by French dithering, took over the primary funding of Islamic insurgency from French Intelligence. Islamic insurgency then became a real threat to the British, their puppet King in Iraq, and more importantly US oil interests in the Middle East. For Germany the situation was urgent and critical. The Axis powers desperately needed to shut down the Iraqi oil concessions granted to UK and US oil companies which were being used to supply British combat operations against the Italian Empire in Africa. The Italian Army had already been defeated in Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and was now in full retreat across Libya. Italian forces in Libya, already heavily re-enforced by the Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK) and the Luftwaffe, also desperately needed a French attack on Suez from the north through Palestine. Both UK and US oil companies pumped most of their Iraqi oil through the British pipeline, across British Palestine to the giant British refinery in Haifa, which was the primary source of refined fuel supplies for British land / air forces in Africa and for the British Mediterranean Fleet, now based in Alexandria.

The recent capture of airfields in mainland Greece by German and Italian forces was crucial to the redeployment of the French Air Force from French North Africa to Syria and Lebanon for attacks on the British. By April 1941 France had almost 300 modern combat aircraft in Syria and Lebanon, poised to attack Iraq and the Haifa refinery in Palestine. These were soon joined by He 111s and Bf 110s of the Luftwaffe. Finally (perhaps as many as) forty Regia Aeronautica combat aircraft arrived in Syria and quickly donned false Iraqi Air Force markings. By late April 1941 the Islamic insurgency had almost 400 modern combat aircraft available in theatre to support them as they staged 'The Iraqi Revolt'.

France now massed seven infantry battalions and eleven motorised or cavalry battalions together with two artillery groups and supporting units in Lebanon on the border of British Palestine, poised for an attack on Haifa and then Suez from the north. By 3rd April 1941 the insurgents had seized control of Baghdad and were preparing to re-allocate UK and US oil concessions to France, Germany and Italy. But before that was possible it was necessary for the insurgency to persuade both the Iraqi Army and the RIAF to join the revolt. For several weeks RIAF aircrew were reluctant to join the German funded revolt and melted away.

About a third of the crude oil pumped from Iraq to the British refinery at Haifa was owned by U.S. oil companies, who were selling almost all of it to the British. The US legislature quickly passed the Lend-Lease Act. Britain would henceforth be allowed to lease military equipment to fight France, Germany and Italy (the Axis powers), paying the massive accrued rental fees due only after the war against the Axis powers was over, (hence Lend-Lease). When the rental payments finally became due they would nearly bankrupt Britain.

On 25th April 1941 the United States, annoyed by growing Axis threats to US oil interests in Iraq, and resentful of ever increasing German intimidation and aggression in the Atlantic, declared a Warship Exclusion Zone (WEZ) extending 2,000 miles eastwards into the Atlantic. U.S. Navy attacks on German U boats inside the WEZ began immediately. From 25th April 1941 the United States was engaged in an undeclared naval war on Germany, (but not yet the other Axis powers), and retaliation by the Kriegsmarine would soon be attempted.

The following day, with British forces increasingly redeployed due to events in Iraq, and the apparently imminent French attack on Palestine, the Italian Army, now much re-enforced by the Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK) and Luftwaffe, pushed British forces back into Egypt from Libya. By 30th April Iraqi insurgents were besieging RAF Habbaniyah and had already taken all BOAC personnel based at the adjacent BOAC/RAF flying boat base on Lake Habbaniyah as hostages.

On 2nd May 1941 the aircrew of the RIAF finally mutinied to support the insurgency and 5 Sqn RIAF became 5 Sqn IAF. Their Ba 65s then flew mostly counter air sorties against nearby RAF Habbaniyah since their heavy two seaters lacked the combat radius to attack the port and RAF/BOAC base in Basra through which the British were landing re-enforcements to support their toppled puppet government. The first IAF Ba 65 lay down attack on RAF Habbaniyah took the RAF by surprise and succeeded in destroying three RAF aircraft without loss, but in subsequent attacks on RAF Habbaniyah Bredas were lost to British AAA. Again the best RAF fighter in theatre was the Gloster Gladiator. There was only one successful interception of an IAF Ba 65 by an RAF Gladiator over Habbaniyah on 2nd May 1941 and the Breda successfully engaged defensive and escaped.

On 5th May 1941 the two Vickers Valentia bomber transports based at RAF Habbaniyah began day bombing insurgent positions around their stronghold at Fallujah. In theory the Ba 65 finally had an enemy aircraft it might have been able to intercept and shoot down, but no attempt was made to use IAF Bredas as interceptors or as fighter CAP over Fallujah, presumably due to the absence of any appropriate Iraqi command and control capability. 5th May 1941 also seems to have been the last date on which Bredas attacked RAF Habbaniyah. Thereafter they seem to have operated against British land forces advancing from Habbaniyah to Fallujah or surrounding Fallujah.

On 10th May 1941, on Hitler's orders, the Deputy Fuhrer of Germany (Hess) parachuted into Britain to offer an immediate cessation of worldwide hostilities by the Axis powers against the British, including cessation of the Iraqi insurgency, if Britain would allow the Axis powers a free hand in continental Europe. Despite the unilateral Luftwaffe night bombing pause from that date, to co-incide with the offered German peace talks, this peace initiative was immediately rejected out of hand by Churchill.

From 12th May, fearful that the IAF Ba 65s would manage daylight interception, the two RAF Vickers Valentias began to bomb 5 Sqn's base at Al Rachid by night and were slowly destroying the IAF Ba 65s on the ground. On 13th May 1941 the Franco-German backed leader of the Islamic world, the Mufti of Jerusalem, now suddenly based in Baghdad, called for a world wide Jihad against the British Empire. That night the Valentias bombed the IAF base at Mosul, but on 14th May after further attacks by Bredas against British forces around Fallujah the Valentias resumed night bombing of Al Rachid. It is not clear whether IAF Bredas were still flying combat missions after that bombing raid, but it seems unlikely that it was decisive in curtailing Breda attacks on British forces who were slowly advancing east from Habbaniyah to the insurgent stronghold in Fallujah.

On 15th May 1941 having urgently redeployed to Palestine the British Desert Air Force began the bombing of French, German and Italian air bases in Syria and Lebanon. From the 19th May the Valentias returned to their more usual role as daytime troop transports, first landing British troops in unprepared open ground east of Fallujah, then flying water in and casualties out as the battle for Fallujah then proceeded with British forces now astride the MSR from Baghdad to Fallujah. This re-supply and CASEVAC activity was curtailed by Syrian based Luftwaffe Bf 110s and He 111s attacking RAF Habbaniyah in force on 20th May.

German U-boats continued to sink U.S. merchant ships inside the WEZ and USN warships continued to attack German U boats. On 19th May 1941 Germany released 100,000 French prisoners of war allowing them to return to France to rejoin Vichy armed forces. After bitter house to house fighting Fallujah fell to the British on 23rd May 1941.

The Kriegsmarine now ordered the German battleships Bismarck and Prinz Eugen into the Atlantic to further challenge the US WEZ. On 24th May while en route they sank the Royal Navy's flagship HMS Hood. On the 27th May 1941 President Roosevelt declared an 'unlimited national emergency', but even as he broadcast to the American nation, to warn them that a declaration of war was imminent, the Bismarck already crippled by RN Fairey Swordfish, was sunk by RN cruisers. From then onwards the RAF Valentias switched to making daylight propaganda leaflet raids over all major Iraqi cities.

On 29th May 1941 the USAAC announced it would begin training RAF pilots to fight against the Axis powers. On 30th May the leader of the Iraqi insurgency fled to Iran, and on 1st June 1941 Baghdad, and all its air bases, fell to British forces. The Jihad soon collapsed and the British puppet King was soon restored to power.

The morale of the mutinous IAF Breda pilots had been shattered somewhat earlier. The British discovered two abandoned but airworthy Ba 65s on Al Rachid air base. The rest of the IAF Ba 65s had been damaged beyond repair by British AAA over Habbaniyah or by Valentia bombing raids. Nobody knows how many combat sorties the IAF Bredas flew against the British in May 1941. The presence of, (a reported), forty Regia Aeronautica combat aircraft and crews, based in Syria, and clandestinely flying for the IAF in Iraqi markings, makes it very difficult to determine which sorties were truly IAF from Baghdad, and which were really RA from Syria, even though the RA had no surviving Ba 65s to deploy for the April - May 1941 Axis assault on Iraq.

With Germany already releasing most French PoWs to rejoin Vichy land, naval and air forces, on 7th June 1941 the U.S. Navy began to seize French merchant ships including the 83,000 ton passenger liner SS Normandie. British special forces, who had been operating covertly inside Lebanon and Syria against French funded terrorist training camps since June 1938, now began overt combat operations against the French Levant, seizing key bridges over the Litani River. Among those wounded that night whilst serving with a Special Night Squad of the British 7th Australian Division was Moshe Dayan, who lost an eye to a French bullet. At dawn on the 8th, with the key bridges already taken, British forces invaded the French colonies of Lebanon and Syria overland from Palestine, and via simultaneous amphibious Royal Marine landings launched from the British colony of Cyprus. Luftwaffe bombers now based in Greece, did their best to stem the British invasion and to help the French, but 179 French combat aircraft were destroyed by the British Desert Air Force and Damascus fell before the month was out.

These urgent British combat operations to defend Iraq and the Haifa refinery from the Axis powers greatly diminished British ability to resist the combined Italian Army and Deutsche Afrika Corps blitzkrieg assault on the western front in Egypt, where British supply was now low and equipment lacking. On 10th June 1941 US merchant ships began to unload Lend - Lease war supplies directly in Suez instead of unloading purchased supply only in Cape Town.

Their departure from the US had been conditional on the sinking of the Bismarck which had been despatched to prevent the first ever Lend-Lease convoy sailing in time to save Suez from Axis occupation. As soon as US ships began supply of British forces in Suez Hitler retaliated by ordering plans to be drawn up for the invasion of Turkey, Iraq and Iran in succession from Greece to seize all UK and US oil concessions. Only a shadow of its former imperial and military strength, on 18th June 1941, Turkey signed a 'Treaty of Friendship' with Germany, permitting German forces to move unhindered across Turkey from Greece to the Iraqi border.

On 22nd June 1941 one hundred and fifty-one German divisions with over three million troops invaded the Soviet Union and the urgent need to either defeat British forces in the field by mid June, else make peace with the British by mid June at any price, became obvious. Over reliant on dive bombing and on Air-Land warfare, things were destined to go badly for German forces in the Soviet Union during the coming winter, and Germany then had no spare troops with which to invade the oil rich Middle East via Turkey. With British troops and air power now based all along the southern Turkish border that was now much more difficult anyway.

Beirut was not taken by the British until 12th July 1941. BOAC then flew General de Gaulle in from his HQ in the French Congo to attend the victory celebrations and to persuade his countrymen to help liberate France. The British had taken 37,736 French prisoners of war in five weeks of bitter fighting. Given the choice of being repatriated to France and fascist rule, or joining the Free French, only 5,668 French prisoners chose to join the Free French Army under de Gaulle to fight for the liberation of France. With British troops now all along their southern border Turkey quickly rescinded its treaty of friendship with Germany and UK/US oil concessions in Iraq were finally safe from both Axis backed insurgency and Axis bombers.

This may all seem to have been a reckless gamble by the Axis powers, always doomed to align US interests with British interests, but it was all about timing, not the end result. Germany knew that the US had already decided to support Britain.........eventually. German intelligence had broken all relevant US codes long before.

Germany gambled wrongly that increased naval aggression against the US was the best way to prevent decisive US support for the British, before it was too late because the British had already lost Suez to yet another summer blitzkrieg. The plan to take Egypt from the west, and both Palestine and Iraq from the north in April and May 1941, while the US faced with massive merchant shipping losses in the Atlantic dithered for just a few weeks too long, was only doomed after the Bismarck was removed by the RN as a clear and present danger to the US ships which would carry the first ever Lend - Lease supply to the British.

Germany needed the Luftwaffe, the DAK, and Rommel to be elsewhere by late June, but had already gambled that deploying Luftwaffe sturmkampf assets to Africa to spearhead the Axis spring offensive on the western front, supported by the DAK, would deliver a swift blitzkrieg victory in time to redeploy both the Luftwaffe and the DAK again in late June. There was never any point deploying German forces in Africa unless the British could be 'forced' to weaken their African defences for just long enough to allow that brief German deployment to achieve another swift summer blitzkrieg on the western front. Only one target had a higher strategic value than Suez and could possibly lure the British Desert Air Force out of Egypt, and that was Iraq.

The reality is that for both the British and the Axis powers it was a very close run thing. The Axis powers gambled that the United States would delay and the British gambled that once Iraqi oil concessions were threatened by the Axis powers American support for Britain would be swift and decisive. It was vital that Lend-Lease legislation passed in April be turned into actual Lend-Lease supply on the dockside in Cairo in early June. The desperate Bismarck war patrol of late May 1941 was a last German gamble to make the US delay the earliest Lend - Lease seaborne supply for just long enough, and which the Royal Navy therefore had to defeat at any cost. The sinking of the Bismarck removed the final straw preventing open and rapid material US support for the British. Decisive British action to secure Iraq and Haifa, followed by equally decisive and material US support for the weakened British forces defending Egypt was the pivot point of Axis and British fortunes in WW2.

It is likely that all fourteen surviving Iraqi Ba 65s flew combat missions against the British during May 1941, playing their small part of this wide ranging Axis strategic gamble, but the number of sorties they flew is unknown. The (up to) forty Regia Aeronautica aircraft operating in fake Iraqi markings greatly confused the picture concerning genuine Iraqi air force attacks. Italy did not want to provoke the US and wished to pretend it had not participated in attacks on US oil interests. Italy even decided not to fly bombing missions against the British as they invaded Lebanon, despite Italian air bases in their colony of Rhodes being much nearer than German air bases in Greece. The deception was pointless. The United States had decided to treat all Axis powers, including even France, the same from 7th June 1941 onwards.

IAF sorties against the British from Baghdad in May 1941 were the last combat sorties flown by Breda 65s anywhere. RAF Habbaniyah (OR1H) is easy enough to locate during simulation of combat operations from IAF Baghdad (use OR0Q) since it is only 35 miles distant and lies just north of Lake Habbaniyah on the MSR west from Baghdad which crosses the giant River Euphrates at Fallujah. It really isn't necessary to use avionics of any kind to simulate such sorties. The IAF Ba 65s were two seaters, but in practical terms it makes no difference when the target is only 35 miles away. Even a two seater could lift its normal bomb load and enough fuel for a mission that short and IAF lay down attack and strafing doctrine was no different to RA or RAF doctrine. The IAF Bredas had no external bomb racks.

I hope this text has revealed the timeline, basing, targets, mission profiles, warload v range curve, combat doctrines, successes, failures, relevance, context, and importance, (or otherwise), of Breda 65 combat operations, which would otherwise have remained obscure. It should now be possible to flight plan many interesting and realistic Ba 65 training and combat sorties in FS9. Now would be a good time to read 'How to survive flying the Breda 65' which explains how to simulate the relevant combat doctrines in detail, and general Ba 65 operation and handling in enough detail to be of use to flight simulation enthusiasts who have never attempted significant realism within flight simulation before.

FSAviator December 2009.


COMPOSITION OF REGIA AERONAUTICA's UNITS

A Regia Aeronautica's 'Stormo'(Wing) was composed of two 'Gruppi'(groups); every 'Gruppo'(group) comprised three 'Squadriglie'(squadrons), with 12 aircraft to every squadron.
Often 'Gruppi" and 'Squadriglie' got autonomous status, independently of specific 'Stormo' (Gruppo/i Autonomo/i, Squadriglia/e Autonoma/e).

Manuele Villa April 2010.